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Abstract 
 
The main goal for most firms is to maximise firm value and the wealth of shareholders. 
In order to achieve this goal, firms should use an optimal combination of equity and 
debt that will result in a low weighted average cost of capital for the firm. It is therefore 
necessary for firms to be aware of the factors that influence their capital structure 
decision.  
Several empirical studies have attempted to explain what determines the choice of 
capital structure in firms. However few have focused solely on Norwegian firms. Hence, 
the primary objective of this study is to examine what determines the capital structure 
in listed Norwegian firms. 
DataStream was used to obtain the data needed for the statistical analysis and previous 
studies were used to calculate the measures for the firm-specific characteristics. The 
study was conducted over a period of 7 years, from 2007 to 2013, and there were a 
total of 90 firms in the sample, resulting in 876 observations.  
The results from the study indicate that tangibility is the most important firm 
characteristic to consider when making capital structure decisions. Furthermore, the 
results indicate a difference between the book value and market value of debt. Book 
value of leverage finds support in the pecking order theory, while none of the theories 
fully explains the observed capital structure in Norwegian firms. Based on the evidence 
obtained from this research, firms should take these firm-specific factors into account 
when making capital structure decisions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The first chapter in this paper will give an introduction to the topic of capital structure 
and an overview of the thesis. This chapter will consist of four sections, background to the 
research topic, purpose of study, aims and objectives and an outline of the structure. 
1.1 Background 
 
Modern theory of capital structure began with Miller and Modigliani (1958) and their 
famous proposition that described how and why capital structure is irrelevant. Since 
then, an extensive amount of research has focused on how companies decide between 
equity and debt for financing. The financial crisis of 2008 contributed to increased 
attention towards capital structure decisions, as it highlighted the importance of 
deviations from Miller and Modigliani’s irrelevance theorem (Kashyap and Zingales, 
2010).  
Several researchers have tried to determine what factors affect companies’ financing 
decision. Overall this has resulted in two main theories, the pecking order theory and 
the trade-off theory. The trade-off theory explains that the choice of capital structure is 
a result of a trade-off between the benefits of debt, such as the debt tax shield, and the 
costs of debt, including bankruptcy costs and costs of financial distress. By contrast, the 
pecking order theory advances that companies prefer the cheapest source of funding. 
Because of information asymmetry, companies will prefer internal to external funding 
and debt over equity (Myers, 1984).  
The two theories of capital structure represents the basis for many studies that have 
been done later, in which the analysis try to determine which model best explains the 
choice of financing and what factors might make up the capital structure decision. 
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However past empirical research has provided contradictory results and evidence of 
the theories’ ability to explain capital structure remains limited. Researchers 
continuously strive to determine the most important determinants of capital structure 
and how it varies across companies, industries and countries. 
This thesis analyses the explanatory power of established theories and firm-specific 
factors from the literature in explaining the choice of capital structure across 
Norwegian listed firms. This study is based on a panel data set from 2007 to 2013 and 
consists of 90 companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. This study will use panel 
data regression analysis to empirically understand how different firm-specific factors 
impact firms’ leverage ratio. 
1.2 Research problem  
 
The combination of debt and equity for a firm represents a firm’s target capital 
structure, and is one of the most important decisions a firm has to make. In order to 
determine the target, firms should be aware of the factors that can influence their 
choice of capital. Based on previous empirical research, six firm-specific characteristics 
were chosen for this study; profitability, size, growth, tangibility, liquidity and non-
debt tax shield. Furthermore, the effect of these characteristics will be examined for 
two measurements of leverage, book value and market value. 
Several studies on this topic have already been conducted for different countries. 
However, except for Frydenberg (2004) and his research on capital structure in the 
Norwegian manufacturing sector, few have focused solely on the determinants of 
capital structure for Norwegian firms. This represents a gap in the existing literature 
and provides a purpose for this study. 
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1.3 Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this study is to determine the effect firm-specific characteristics have on the 
capital structure of Norwegian listed firms. Based on this, the following secondary 
objectives have been formulated: 
 Analyse whether firm-specific characteristics can explain the variation in capital 
structure across Norwegian firms. 
 Determine if book value of leverage and market value of leverage produce 
different results. 
 Look at the dominant theories of capital structure and examine if the trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory can explain the observed capital structure 
of Norwegian firms.  
 
1.4 Outline 
 
Following the introduction, this paper is structured into four chapters 
1. Introduction 
The first chapter describes the background for this paper, followed by the 
purpose of study and a presentation of the aims and objectives of this thesis.  
2. Theoretical Framework:  
This chapter will present capital markets in a perfect and an imperfect setting, 
discuss the propositions of Miller and Modigliani and present the two most 
dominant theories of capital structure, the pecking order theory and the trade-
off theory. Furthermore, previous empirical research will be analysed and 
discussed and an overview of how Norwegian companies have access to capital 
 10 
will be presented. Finally, the determinants of capital structure used in this 
paper will be presented. 
3. Methodology:  
This chapter will present hypotheses that will be tested in this paper, as well as 
the research methods used. How the data is collected will also be described and 
estimation methods will be evaluated and illustrated.  
4. Analysis: 
The fourth chapter will analyse the data by using the most feasible estimation 
model found in the previous chapter. The hypotheses will be tested and based 
on this the findings will be presented.  
5. Conclusion:  
This chapter will summarise this research paper and provide a conclusion, 
present the limitations of the study and provide recommendations for future 
research 
 
 11 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
This chapter will first explain capital structure in a perfect market and present Miller and 
Modigliani proposition I and II. Thereafter, capital structure in an imperfect market will 
be explained by using the two main theories of capital structure; the trade off theory and 
the pecking order theory. Then I will discuss imperfect capital markets, before previous 
empirical research on the determinants of capital structure will be evaluated. This section 
will also include cross-country studies that involve Norway.  
2.1 Defining capital Structure 
The overall purpose of a firm is to maximise firm value and create value for 
shareholders. Firm value is calculated by the present value of its expected future cash 
flows, discounted by the weighted average cost of capital. In order to maximise the 
value of the firm, management need to make investments in order to generate cash 
flows. These investments requires funds and companies have to decide whether they 
want to use debt or equity. The optimal mix of debt and equity can minimise the 
weighted average cost of capital and increase shareholder value, and consequently the 
value of the firm (Berk and DeMarzo, 2013). Capital Structure is an expression of how a 
company is financing its total assets and is a decision that poses a lot of challenges for 
firms. Determining an appropriate mix of equity and debt is one of the most strategic 
decisions companies are confronted with (Modugu, 2013, p. 14).  A firm has three main 
sources of financing at their disposal to fund their investments. This includes the use of 
retained earnings, issuing new shares and borrowing money. Together these financing 
options represent a firm’s capital structure, as well as its ownership structure.   
In 1958 Miller and Modigliani stated that capital structure was irrelevant as the value 
of the company would be the same regardless of how a company is financed.  Based on 
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this, discussions and theories have been developed in the literature aiming to explain if 
an optimal capital structure exists and what factors are determining the choice of 
capital structure. According to Myers (2003, p. 3) there does not exist a universal 
theory of capital structure, only useful conditional theories that differ in the factors 
that affect the choice of capital structure. The following chapter will present theories 
that are relevant for my research question and I will explain and discuss why I believe 
these theories are important for my analysis. Furthermore I will briefly present past 
studies on the determinants of capital structure. 
 
2.2 Capital structure in a perfect market 
With perfect capital markets there is not possible to influence a company’s value 
through how the company is financed. Capital markets are said to be perfect in the 
absence of agency costs, taxes, transaction costs and asymmetrical information. In the 
real world, capital markets are not perfect. However, it can be useful to evaluate how 
closely the assumptions hold and consider the consequences of any deviations (Berk & 
Demarzo, 2013).  
2.2.1. Miller and Modigliani 
“The pizza delivery man comes to Yogi Berra after the game and says, Yogi, how do you 
want this pizza cut, into quarters or eights? And Yogi says, cut it in eight pieces. I’m 
feeling hungry tonight” 1(Miller, 1997 explains the irrelevance theorem) 
 
                                                        
1 In the book Investment Gurus (1997, p. 194), Peter J. Tanous interviews Merton Miller. When he is 
asked to quickly summarize the Miller & Modigliani proposition I he does it with a joke. He illustrates 
that the shape of the pizza pieces does not affect the actual size of the pizza. Similarly, the way a 
company decides on capital structure, do not affect the aggregate value of the firm.  
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The first important insights into the choice of capital structure and its correlation with 
firm value started with Miller and Modigliani in 1958. Under the conditions of perfect 
capital markets they demonstrated the following regarding the role of capital structure 
in determining firm value (Berk & Demarzo, 2013): 
M&M proposition I: In a perfect capital market, a company’s total market value is 
independent of its capital structure 
 
Formula 1: Miller & Modigliani Proposition I:  
VL = VU = VA 
 
The proposition implies that the total market value of a firm’s securities is equal to the 
market value of its assets, regardless of whether the firm is leveraged or not. The cost 
of debt has traditionally been lower then that of equity when calculating the capital 
requirements, as debt is less risky. Arguably it will therefore be more beneficial to 
finance a company with debt, as it is relatively cheaper. However Miller and Modigliani 
states that the capital composition of a company is irrelevant as it does not affect the 
company’s cash flow or its market value (Miller and Modigliani, 1958). On the balance 
sheet, the total market value of a firm’s assets equals the total market value of the 
firm’s liabilities, including securities issued to investors. Changing the capital structure 
will therefore only alter how the value of the assets is divided across securities, but not 
the total value of the firm (Berk and Demarzo, 2014).  In a perfect capital market it 
would not be a problem for an investor to replicate any capital composition. 
Their second proposition, which is a direct development of the first one, discusses how 
risk and return on equity change as a result of alterations in the debt ratio: 
M&M proposition II: The expected return on equity in a leveraged company will 
increase proportionally with the debt-to-equity ratio.  
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By interpreting formula 1 in terms of market values we get the following expression: 
Formula 2: Cost of unlevered equity (Pretax WACC) 
 
 
 
By solving formula 2 for rE we get the following expression for the levered return on 
equity (Berk and Demarzo, 2013): 
 
Formula 3: Miller & Modigliani Proposition II 
 
 
 
The return on levered equity (rE) equals the unlevered return (rU), plus and extra 
“kick” because of leverage (D/E*(rU-rD)). This effect causes an even higher return on 
levered equity when the firm performs well (rU > rD), but makes it drop even lower 
when the firm performs poorly (rU < rD) (Berk and Demarzo, 2013). 
Miller and Modigliani’s theory provides a theoretical framework for understanding 
capital structure. However, it does not provide a realistic description of how 
companies should decide on an optimal capital structure (Frank & Goyal, 2005). By 
assuming perfect capital markets, they rather highlight the factors such as, taxes, 
asymmetry, bankruptcy etc. that makes capital structure relevant. As a result, their 
theory has been groundbreaking in the field of corporate finance and provides an 
important foundation for understanding capital structure. 
 

ru 
E
E D
re 
D
E D
rd
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2.3 Capital structure in an imperfect market 
In reality, capital markets are not perfect, and the assumptions that Miller and 
Modigliani made did not consider factors such as the tax advantages of debt, 
asymmetric information, bankruptcy costs and financial distress. However in 1963 
they modified their propositions in order to account for the tax benefits of debt. Today 
there are two main theories trying to explain how companies allocate their capital in 
an imperfect market, the “Trade-off theory” and the “Pecking order theory” (Myers, 
1984). 
2.3.1 Taxes and Capital structure 
Miller and Modigliani (1963) modified their propositions and considered the interest 
rate on debt to be offset by the tax savings from the interest tax shield. They assumed 
that debt was risk-free and would be held permanently, so that the value of the tax 
shield could be considered a perpetuity (Berk and DeMarzo, 2013): 
 
 PV (interest tax shield) =  
 
Proposition I can now be rewritten as:  VL = VU +  
 
By including taxes in formula 2, we can an expression for the weighted average cost of 
capital. 
 
Formula 4: The Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
 

c  (rf  D)
rf
c  D

c D

rwacc 
E
E D
rE 
D
E D
rD(1c )
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The weighted average cost of capital represents the effective cost of capital to the firm, 
after including the benefits of the interest tax shield. The higher the firm’s leverage, the 
more the firm will exploit the tax advantages of debt, and the lower its WACC is. When 
making financing decisions, the capital used should be a weighted average of the 
various costs of each capital component. (Berk and DeMarzo, 2013) 
2.3.2 The Static Trade-Off theory  
The Trade-Off theory emerged as a result of the debate over the Miller & Modigliani 
theorem (Frank and Goyal, 2008).  The theory states that the “…total value of a levered 
firm equals the value of the firm without leverage plus the present value of the tax 
savings from debt minus the present value of financial distress costs” (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2013, p. 574).  
Formula 5: VL = VU + PV (Interest Tax Shield) – PV (Financial Distress Costs) 
 
Where VL is leveraged firm value, VU is unleveraged firm value and PV is present value. 
The optimal level of debt is what maximizes VL. To maximise firm value, companies will 
operate at the top of the curve in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Optimal firm value
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According to Myers (1984), more debt involves increased costs associated with 
bankruptcy and financial distress. When the risk of incurring these costs increases, the 
value of the firm will decrease and capital will become more expensive. As a result, 
there exists an optimal capital structure that reflects a trade-off between the costs of 
bankruptcy or financial distress and the tax benefits of debt. This implies that 
companies should set a target financial debt ratio (Frank and Goyal, 2008; Swinnen et 
al., 2005). However the optimal debt ratio will vary across firms because tax rate, 
bankruptcy costs and the impact of financial distress vary across firms.  With regards 
to determinants of capital structure, the theory claims that profitable firms will try to 
protect their profits from debt, resulting in a higher level of leverage. Furthermore, 
growth will have a negative impact on debt because the risk of financial distress will be 
higher for growing firms.  
2.3.3 Pecking order theory 
The Pecking order theory was developed by Stewart C. Myers in 1984 and defines a 
ranking of preferred capital. Furthermore Myers (2003, p. 3) claims that“…financing 
adapts to mitigate problems created by differences in information between insiders and 
outside investors”. The theory can be explained from the existence of transaction costs 
and the perspective of asymmetric information (Swinnen et al. 2005). Because of this, 
companies prefer retained earnings to debt and will only under extreme circumstances 
use equity as financing (Myers, 1984). As a result, variation in a company’s debt level is 
driven by the company’s net cash flow and not by the trade-off between the costs and 
benefits of debt (Fama & French, 2002). Information asymmetry occurs when the owner-
managers have full information about the true value and quality of the company, whereas 
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investors have less information. This makes it difficult for investors to separate good and 
bad quality companies. Investors make up for this uncertainty by requiring a higher rate 
of return and thus make capital more expensive for companies (Frank & Goyal, 2008). 
Asymmetric information can in turn lead to adverse selection problem 
Under pecking order conditions companies prefer internal to external financing. 
Therefore profitable firms will borrow less as they have more internal financing 
available (Myers, 2003, p. 27) and less profitable firms will use more debt. There is no 
specific debt-to-value ratio for firms in this theory, so the level of debt a company has 
incurred reflects the need for external finance, rather than a specific target (Myers, 1984, 
p. 576). Furthermore, companies with more volatile net cash flows are according to the 
theory, are more likely to have less leverage (Fama & French, 2002) 
 
Figure 2: Pecking order Theory 
Source: Own contribution 
 
1 
Internal 
Financing 
Retained Earnings 
2 
External 
Financing 
Debt 
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External 
Financing 
Equity 
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2.3.4 International Capital Markets 
International capital markets have experienced rapid changes since the mid 1970’s. 
Financial markets have been deregulated, capital controls have been reduced, new 
financial instruments have emerged and investors have seen the benefit of reduced 
risk in holding a diversified portfolio. In addition, new technology has led to lower 
transaction costs and made the access to international markets easier (Errunza & 
Miller, 2000). Despite this, research have shown that investors prefer to invest in their 
home country regardless of the lower risk associated with holding an international 
portfolio. This implies that it exist barriers to international capital mobility and thus 
capital markets are imperfect (Bayoumi, 1997).  The literature presents several factors 
that may serve as barriers to international capital mobility. Medeiros & Quinteiro 
(2008) suggest that transaction costs is the main barrier, stressing that it will induce 
concentration in domestic portfolios. Transaction costs include taxes and restrictions 
to capital markets, as well as informational disadvantages. Additionally, Eiteman et al 
(2013) states that other barriers include exchange rate risk, illiquidity in the domestic 
financial market and different market risk-return trade offs.  
2.3.4.1 The Cost of Capital 
The capital market imperfects have important influence on a firms’ marginal cost of 
capital, and thus their weighted average cost of capital (See appendix A).  
The availability of capital depends on whether a firm can gain liquidity for its securities 
and their price based on international rather than national standards. Eiteman et al. 
(2013, p. 382) stresses that firms that are able to attract foreign investors can 
“…escape the constraints of their own illiquid or segmented market”. Furthermore the 
international availability of capital to firms may let them lower their cost of equity and 
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debt. In addition, it allows firms to maintain a desired debt ratio, even if significant 
amounts of debt need to be raised. Arguably, as a result, firm’s that have the 
opportunity to source funds internationally have a constant marginal cost of capital for 
large parts of their capital budget (Eiteman, 2013). However empirical studies differ in 
their results regarding whether or not multinational firms have a higher cost of capital 
compared to firms that only source funds domestically.  
Henderson et al. (2006) mentions several reasons for why firms would choose to raise 
capital in globally rather than in their home country, including risk sharing, lower cost 
of capital and potentially lower transaction costs. They find evidence of credit market 
segmentation and that a volatile environment affects capital structure choice for firms. 
Moreover, they argue that a firms’ decision to issue equity is influenced by both firm-
specific factors and macroeconomic conditions.  They show that firms are more likely 
to issue equity in favourable macroeconomic conditions where the equity market is 
overvalued. This research is supported by studies conducted by Stultz (1995), Singh & 
Nejadmalayeri and Errunza & Miller (2000) who also provide evidence of the beneficial 
impact of sourcing funds internationally in order to gain a lower cost of capital. 
However Lee & Kwok (1988) arrived at the opposite conclusion when they discovered 
evidence that international funding could potentially lead to a higher cost of capital. 
Their study found that multinational firms have higher bankruptcy costs, political risk 
and asymmetric information compared to firms that kept to their domestic capital 
markets.  
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2.4 Empirical research  
Previous empirical research regarding capital structure provides no general model on 
the determinants of capital structure.  Appendix B.1 lists some recent studies on the 
matter and it shows that each researcher considers different factors when analysis the 
level of debt for companies. After considering the available data, the most common 
determinants based on previous research and theory was decided upon. As a result, the 
final set of independent variables includes six factors; Profitability, non-debt tax shield, 
tangibility, firm size, liquidity and growth. 
2.4.1 Analysis of selected previous empirical research 
Antoniou et al. (2002) researched the determinants of capital structure of French, 
British and German companies using panel data from 1969-2000. They chose to 
examine these countries together as they are characterised by different financial 
systems and traditions, something that may affect the amount of leverage in a 
company. Surprisingly enough, their findings suggest that factors affect the three 
countries in the same way despite of this. Further they get a positive relationship 
between leverage and size, while the opposite is the case for growth and leverage. For 
fixed assets, profitability and effective tax rates, they discover that the factors varies in 
the direction and degree of influence on leverage across the sample countries. This 
shows that capital structure decisions do not only depend on firm-specific factors, but 
also the environment the company operates in. 
Nunkoo & Boateng (2009) researched non-financial Canadian companies between 
1996 and 2004 using panel data and a dynamic regression model. Their result 
suggested that firms have long-term target debt ratios, but with a slow adjustment 
ratio. Furthermore they find that profitability and tangibility have a positive effect on 
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the amount of leverage a company has, while there was a negative effect based own 
size and growth opportunities. 
Titman & Wessels (1988) researched the explanatory power of different factors from 
theories of optimal capital structure. Their data is collected from American industrial 
companies from 1974-1982.  They did not find any significant relationship between 
leverage and volatility, tangibility, growth and non-debt tax shield. However, they 
discovered a negative relationship between debt and profitability and a negative 
correlation between size and short-term debt. The most surprising discovery in their 
study is that the level of debt is negatively correlated with the uniqueness of the 
company.  
Frank & Goyal (2004) did a similar study but on publicly traded U.S firms from 1950 to 
2000. They discover that firms tend to have lower levels of debt the more profitable 
they are. Furthermore their results suggest that firm tangibility is significant and 
causes firms to have more debt, the more collateral they have. In addition they 
conclude that larger firms tend to have more leverage compared to smaller firms. 
Finally they found that dividend-paying firms have less leverage and that leverage 
tends to be higher when the US inflation rate is high.  Overall they find that the pecking 
order theory does a poor job in explaining capital structure. 
Frydenberg (2004) has conducted one of the few empirical studies that have been done 
on capital structure of Norwegian firms. He focuses on firms in the Norwegian 
manufacturing sector between 1990 and 2000. He discovers that the pecking order 
theory finds significant support in the results of the study. His findings suggest that 
profitable firms tend to have less debt and that firms with a large amount of fixed 
assets tend to increase long-term debt and decrease short-term debt. The effect of the 
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non-debt tax shield is significant and negative in his study. Which indicates that firms 
substitute debt for such tax shields.  
2.4.2 Cross-country studies including Norway 
As presented in the previous section, there has been a lot of research conducted 
regarding capital structure. However, few have focused solely on Norway, which leaves 
a gap in relation to knowledge concerning capital structure in Norwegian firms. 
Nevertheless, some cross-country studies have included subsamples of Norwegian 
companies when exploring differences in capital structure across countries. Because 
country-specific factors, including institutional differences, may induce a change in the 
determinants of capital structure, this may help decide on what determinants are most 
important for Norwegian companies. It will also be of interest to explore potential 
differences in the results related to prior research. 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) surveyed managers in sixteen European countries on the 
determinants of capital structure. They discovered that financial flexibility is the most 
important factor when issuing debt, while earnings per share dilution is the primary 
concern when issuing common stock. In their survey, 91% of managers’ rank financial 
flexibility as important compared to only 59% of US CFO’s in a survey conducted by 
Graham and Harvey (2001). This difference may suggest that European companies 
would try to preserve financial flexibility by keeping a lower level of debt. Bancel and 
Mittoo (2004)’s results suggest that the differences in firms’ financial decisions across 
countries are the most significant between Scandinavian and Non-Scandinavian firms. 
La Porta et al. (1997) examined the ability of firms in different legal environments to 
raise external finance through equity or debt.  They confirm that countries’ legal rules 
matters for the size of a country’s capital markets and that differences in shareholder 
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rights, bankruptcy law and the quality of law enforcement have strong impact on 
capital structure. Furthermore they find that the credit rates in Norway are stronger 
than in US, but shareholder rights are weaker.  This implies that we should expect a 
higher debt level in Norway compared to the US.  
Levine et al. (1999) states that Norway can be considered a country with a bank-based 
financial system. This suggests that most companies finance themselves through bank 
loans, in contrast to market based financial systems, like the US, where firms mostly 
fund themselves through the capital markets. It is often assumed that companies in 
bank-based countries have higher leverage and more short-term debt. His results 
however indicate that there is no cross-country empirical evidence for the superiority 
of either the bank-based or the market-based financial system. As a conclusion he 
suggest that specific laws and enforcement mechanisms that govern debt and equity 
transactions are more useful in describing cross-country capital structure.  
2.4.3 Summary of previous empirical research  
Overall the results from previous empirical research show that in general, the same 
characteristics affect the choice of capital structure across countries, however 
institutional factors may lead to differences in the sensitivity of these factors. Previous 
empirical papers are reaching contradictory results in their investigation of the 
relationship between capital structure and company specific factors.  There are 
differences both across industries and geographic areas, as well as considerable 
variation within individual industries.  Even though the effect of the capital structure 
determinants differs, there are still indications that the same factors are evident across 
several studies.  
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2.5 Firm-Specific Determinants of capital structure 
There is a large amount of possible determinants of capital structure choice. This 
makes it challenging to decide which are the most important and how to establish a 
good model to measure the different variables and their degree of significance (Harris 
& Raviv, 1991). However, there is still some consensus amongst researchers that there 
exist some common factors. The two theories described in chapter 2, mostly agrees on 
the factors that determines how a company is finances. However, the assumptions and 
expectations on the extent and direction of how the factors affect capital structure 
differ between the theories.  
This section will present a brief discussion on the determinants that different theories 
of capital structure suggest may affect the amount of leverage in firms. These 
determinants are profitability, size, tangibility, growth, liquidity and non-debt tax 
shield. These determinants, their relationship to capital structure and their link to 
established theories will be discussed individually below. 
Profitability 
Profitability has been the most significant determinant in previous studies regarding 
capital structure. It indicates how well management are able to utilise total assets to 
generate earnings. According to the trade-off theory, the higher the profitability of the 
firm, the more likely the company is to issue debt as it is reducing its tax liability. In 
addition, firms with high a high profitability ratio have less risk of bankruptcy and 
financial distress. Moreover, debt providers will be more willing to lend to profitable 
firms because the probability of default is lower. Therefore the theory predicts a 
positive relationship between leverage and probability. In comparison, the pecking 
order theory predicts a negative relationship, as companies prefer to finance 
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themselves through retained earnings. A profitable firm will retain more earnings and 
as a result, the leverage needed should decrease. Nunkoo and Boateng (2009) studied 
the capital structure in Canadian firms and discovered a significant positive 
relationship between profitability and debt. However most of the previous empirical 
research shows that profitability has a negative effect on leverage (Shah & Khan, 2007; 
Gonsález & Gonsáles, 2012; Ozkan, 2001; etc.). 
Size 
Size is also linked with the leverage of a company. According to the trade-off theory 
large firms will have less risk because they are more diversified and have more stable 
cash flow. Hence, larger firms will have a lower financial distress costs and a lower 
probability of bankruptcy costs. Additionally, larger firms will have a better reputation 
in the debt market because they would receive higher credit ratings since their default 
risk is lower. This implies a positive relationship between size and leverage (Frank & 
Goyal, 2005; Titman & Wessels, 1988). With regards to the pecking order theory, Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) suggested that this relationship could be negative. Larger firms 
have less information asymmetry. Consequently, the chance of issuing undervalued 
equity is reduced and will encourage larger firms to use equity financing. Frank and 
Goyal (2009) agrees, and argues that larger firms have easier access to the capital 
market than their smaller counterparts. As a result, it will be easier to attract equity 
and these firms will thus have less debt. Previous studies vary in concluding whether 
size is a significant factor for capital structure. Empirical studies done by Chen (2004), 
Mazur (2007), Nunkoo & Boateng (2009) amongst others, found a negative 
relationship between size and leverage, while Sbeiti (2010) and Olayinka (2011) 
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discovered a positive relationship. Other studies found that size did not have any 
significant impact on leverage (Shah & Khan, 2007; Noulas & Genimakis, 2011, etc.). 
Tangibility 
Tangible assets include fixed assets, such as machinery and buildings, and current 
assets, such as inventory. Compared to intangible, nonphysical assets, tangible assets 
are easier to collateralize so they will suffer a smaller loss if the company goes into 
financial distress. Tangible assets are associated with a higher leverage ratio as they 
can serve as better collateral for debt (Rajan & Zingales, 1995).  Moreover, a high 
tangibility ratio will lower expected agency costs and problems. According to both 
theories, tangibility will positively affect leverage (Frank & Goyal, 2009). This is 
consistent with the majority of previous empirical research (Shah & Khan 2007; Chen, 
2004; Nunkoo & Boateng 2009 etc.) that discovers that companies with more tangible 
assets has higher leverage ratios. However, Booth et al. (2001) suggests a negative 
relationship between tangibility and debt based on their results.  
Growth 
According to Frank & Goyal (2005; 2009), there should be a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunities based on the trade-off theory. This is 
mainly because growing firms loose more of their value when they go into financial 
distress than mature firms. Growing firms will also have higher agency costs of debt 
because debt holders fear that these growing firms will invest in risky projects for the 
future (Booth et al. 2001). As a result, growth will reduce firm leverage. This is 
consistent with the results from Olayinka (2011) and Ozkan (2010). By contrast, Chen 
(2004) and Booth et al. (2001) estimated a positive relationship between leverage and 
growth. According to the pecking order theory, growing firms should get more debt 
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over time if internal funds are not sufficient to finance investment opportunities. Hence 
the amount of leverage in growing firms should be considerably more than for a 
stagnant firm. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity can be defined as the ability for firms to use current assets to cover their 
current liabilities. Thus, it says something about how well firms meet their short-term 
obligations. In the pecking order theory, internal financing is the most preferable 
source of capital for firms. Therefore, companies are more likely to create reserves 
from retained earnings (Ali et al. 2013).  Firms that are able to convert their assets into 
cash, use these inflows to finance their investments instead of using debt. Conclusively, 
liquidity will have a positive effect on leverage. This is supported by the research 
conducted by Sbeiti (2010) and Ozkan (2001).  
Non-Debt Tax Shield 
According to Ali et al. (2013) debt financing is less attractive if non-debt related 
corporate tax shields exist, such as investments or depreciation. Companies can use 
these non-interest items to reduce their tax bills. In other words, according to the 
trade-off theory, companies with higher non-debt tax shield are likely to use less debt 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988). This is supported by studies conducted by Heshmati (2001) 
and Ozkan (2001). However, Shah & Khan (2007) found non-debt tax shield to be 
insignificant. The pecking order theory does not predict anything obvious with regards 
to non-debt tax shields. 
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Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
The main goal of this chapter is to present the methodical framework for this study and 
develop hypotheses based on the theory presented in the previous part. This section will 
start by describing the data, followed by the general econometric procedure and the 
statistical approach that will be used. The methodical choices that are being made before 
and during a research process are important in order to achieve results that answer the 
research question and are of good quality. 
3.1 Dataset 
Deciding on the time dimension is important for how the research is carried out. The 
most widely used classification for different types of data are; cross-sectional data, 
time series data and panel data. Cross-sectional data are data from units observed at 
the same time or in the same time period. Time-series data are data from a unit or a 
group of units, observed in several successive periods. While panel data is a 
combination of the two and consist of observations of multiple devices over multiple 
periods. The different types of data have different advantages and disadvantages when 
it comes to possibilities, limitations and complexity regarding regression analysis and 
results (Koop, 2009). The choice of data is therefore essential in order to appropriately 
conduct the research.   
3.1.2 Data sample 
For the purpose of this study, the data is collected from secondary sources and the 
researcher intend to use quantitative data based solely on data collected from 
DataStream. DataStream is a financial database with company- and market 
information. The sample collected contains Norwegian companies listed on the Oslo 
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Stock Exchange in the period from 2007-2013. Financial companies, such as banks are 
excluded from this sample because of the financial regulations for these companies. 
Furthermore companies with missing information will be dropped, as well as 
companies with zero in assets as this would not provide a measure for leverage.  A list 
of the companies included in the sample can be found in appendix C. The financial 
information of listed Norwegian companies will be analyzed in STATA in order to 
examine if there is significant relationship between capital structure and its 
determinants.  
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
Econometrics is the art and science of using statistical methods for evaluating 
economic relationships and testing economic theories. This paper will therefore use 
econometrics to analyse the data collected. This section will present a summary of the 
econometric models that will be used, as well as their assumptions and limitations. 
3.2.1 Correlation  
Correlation is a way of numerically quantifying the association between two variables. 
Furthermore it measures the strength and direction of this relationship (Koop, 2013). 
The correlation coefficient always lies between -1 and +1, where -1 indicates that the 
variables are perfectly negatively correlated, while +1 implies perfectly positive 
correlation.  A correlation coefficient equal to 0 indicates that there is no linear 
relationship between the variables.  
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Table 1: The Correlation Coefficients 
Magnitude Indicates 
Between 0.9 and 1 Very highly correlated 
Between 0.7 and 0.9 Highly correlated 
Between 0.5 and 0.7 Moderately correlated 
Between 0.3 and 0.5 Low correlation 
Below 0.3 Little or no correlation 
Source: Own contribution based on Koop (2013) 
 
3.2.2 Ordinary Least Squares 
A regression analysis is a more advanced approach to evaluate the relationship 
between variables and it is the most common tool used in applied economics (Koop, 
2013). The main objective of a regression analysis is to investigate how the value of the 
dependent variable (Y) changes when the value of one of the independent variables 
(X1, X2, X3,…, Xk) changes by one unit. A simple regression model analyses the linear 
relationship between two variables, while a multiple regression model take into 
account that the independent variables can affect each other and jointly affect the 
dependent variable. A panel data OLS regression can be described as: 
 
 Formula 6:  Yit =  + 1itX1it + 2X2i + … + itkXitk + vit i = 1,2, … , N 
 
Where Y is the dependent variable, explained by a constant (), and a specific 
relationship (k) between the explanatory variables (Xk). The composite error term vit 
= (ai + uit) captures all the other unobserved factors that are constant over time (ai), 
and the regular residuals (uit) which now vary over time. To estimate the coefficients 
() and (k) the method of ‘ordinary least squares’ (OLS) is used. This model will have 
(N-k) degrees of freedom, where N is the number of observations and k is the number 
of parameters in the model. 
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The OLS-estimation determines the regression coefficients so that the regression line 
lies as close to the observed data as possible. The vertical difference between a data 
point and the line is called a residual.  The sum of squared residuals is mathematically 
defined as: 
Formula 7:    
The OLS-estimates are found by choosing the values of  and 1, 2, … , k that 
minimize the SSR (Koop, 2013). The OLS regression model is based on several 
underlying assumptions that is necessary for the model to be valid shown in table 6. 
More information about the assumptions are found in appendix 2. 
Table 2: OLS-Assumptions 
 Assumption Explanation 
1 Linearity The dependent variable should be a linear function of the 
independent variables and the error term 
2 Exogenity The expected value of errors is zero and errors are not 
correlated with any regressors 
3 Homoscedasticity Errors have the same variance 
4 Nonautocorrelation Errors are not related to one another 
5 Not stochastic Independent variables are fixed in repeated samples 
without measurement errors. 
6 No multicollinearity There is no exact linear relationship among independent 
variables. 
Source: Park (2011), Koop (2013) 
 
3.2.3 Panel Data  
Panel data are also called longitudinal or cross-sectional time-series data. They have 
observations in several different time periods and on the same units (Kennedy, 2008).  
A panel data set has “multiple entities, each of which has repeated measurements at 
different time periods (Park, 2011). The data set used in this research can be classified 
as panel data as the accounting data are from different time periods but at the same 

SSR  (yi
i1
n
  0  1X1i  ... kXki)
2
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time the companies and the variables are the same. The panel dataset used is defined 
as balanced because the same years are used for each company.  
3.2.4 Panel data estimation Methods 
Based on the literature, it is common to use panel data estimation methods for data 
that combines cross-sectional and time-series data. When using penal data there are 
some assumptions that must be valid for the estimated coefficients to be valid. In this 
analysis the focus will be on three different methods; pooled ordinary least squares, 
fixed effects model and random effects model. The assumptions for each method can be 
found in appendix B. 
Pooled OLS 
If there is no individual heterogeneity, i.e. no cross-sectional or time specific effect (ui = 
0), than ordinary least squares (OLS) provides consistent and efficient parameter 
estimates to use on panel data (Park, 2011). 
 
Formula 8: Yit = 0 + Xit + it 
 
Where: 
 Yit: Dependent variable 
 0: Intercept 
 : Vector of the independent variables coefficient 
 Xit: Vector of the independent variable  
 it: Error term where ui = 0 
 
 
If individual effects are not zero in panel data, heterogeneity may influence the 
assumption of exogenity and nonautocorrelation, and the model will provide biased 
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and inconsistent estimators. If this is the case, the fixed effects model and the random 
effect model provide ways to deal with these problems (Park, 2011) 
Fixed Effects Model 
The fixed effects (FE) model takes the presence of unobserved heterogeneity into 
account and divides the error term into two components; one that captures the 
variation between the different firms analysed (ui) and one that captures the 
remaining disturbance (vit). 
 
Formula 9: Yit = (0 + ui) + Xit + vit 
 
The fixed effects model controls for any possible correlation among the independent 
variables and omitted variables by treating ui as a fixed effect. This means that OLS 
assumption 2 will not be violated. The fixed effects model is estimated by using least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation and a within effect estimation method.  
Random Effects Model 
A random effects model assumes that heterogeneity is not correlated with any 
regressor and that the error variance estimates are specific to firms. Hence ui is a 
component of the composite error term ().  
 
Formula 10: Yit = 0 + Xit + (ui + vit)  
 
The slopes and intercept of regressors will be the same across firms, but the difference 
between firms will lie in their individual errors and not in their intercepts. The random 
effects model is estimated by using generalized least squares (GLS) or an OLS 
estimator. The difference between them is that the GLS estimator will still be efficient 
in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, while OLS will not. On the 
basis of this, the appropriate estimator depends on what assumptions hold.  
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Selection of Estimation Model 
In order to decide on what estimation model that fits the available data best, the 
characteristics of the data should be examined. Firstly, the model should be tested for 
the underlying OLS-assumptions (normality, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation), then for panel data effects. If there is a presence of panel data effects, 
the pooled OLS method should be excluded and random- or fixed estimation models 
should be used. The Hausman specification test will then be conducted in order to 
indicate whether the FE- or RE-model is preferred. However Brooks (2008) claims that 
the random effects model will provide lower volatility and more efficient estimations 
than the fixed effects model. This is based on the fact that the RE-model utilises the 
information in the panel data so that the effects of the independent variables on 
leverage can be illuminated. Another advantage with the RE-model is that less degrees 
of freedom is lost because there are less parameters to estimate. 
 
3.3 The Regression Model 
A regression is an advanced approach to evaluate the relationship between variables 
and it is the most common tool used in applied economics (Koop, 2013). The main 
objective of a regression analysis is to investigate how the value of the dependent 
variable (Y) changes when the value of one of the independent variables (X1, X2, X3,…, 
Xk) changes by one unit. A simple regression model analyses the linear relationship 
between two variables, while a multiple regression model take into account that the 
independent variables can affect each other and jointly affect the dependent variable.  
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This paper will use two different models, model 1 is given by book value of leverage as 
the dependent variable, and model 2 will use market value of leverage as the 
dependent variables. Both models will be used along with the determinants discussed 
in section X as independent variables. Therefore the following general model applies: 
 
Formula 11:  blev/mlev = 0 + 1  profit + 2  sizeit + 3  tangit + 4  growit 
       + 5  liqit + 6  ndtsit + it 
 
The reason for using both book value and market value of leverage is to examine if the 
chosen independent variables affect them differently. While model 1 is based on 
historic accounting values, model 2 incorporates the expectations of future cash flows. 
Table 6 shows the variables and the proxies used in this paper. The proxies have been 
determined based on previous literature, so that it will be easier to compare the 
results.  
 
 Table 3: Variable proxies 
Variable Proxy 
Book Value of Leverage Total Debt / (Total Debt + Book Value of Equity) 
Market Value of Leverage Total Debt / (Total Debt + Market Value of Equity) 
Profitability (P) EBITDA/Total Assets 
Size (S) Ln (Total Sales) 
Tangibility (T) Fixed Assets/Total Assets 
Growth (G) Market capitalisation/Book value 
Liquidity (L) Tot. Current Assets/Tot. Current Liabilities 
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) Depreciation/Total Assets 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the theories presented in chapter 2 and their impact on firms’ capital 
structure, 2 different hypotheses are created and shown in table 7. The first one will be 
formulated based on the trade-off theory, while the second one will be created on the 
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basis of the pecking order theory. The hypothesis testing will be used in order to 
examine whether one theory is better than the other in explaining the capital structure 
of Norwegian listed firms. The null hypothesis will be rejected on the 5% significance 
level. 
 
Table 4: Hypotheses 
Variables Hypotheses  1: Pecking Order 2: Trade Off 
Profitability 
(P) 
A H0: 
HA: 
P has a positive effect on LEV 
P has a negative effect on LEV 
P has a negative effect on LEV 
P has a positive effect on LEV 
Size 
(S) 
B H0: 
HA: 
S has a positive effect on LEV 
S has a negative effect on LEV 
S has a negative effect on LEV 
S has a positive effect on LEV 
Tangibility 
(T) 
C H0: 
HA: 
T has a negative effect on LEV 
T has a positive effect on LEV 
T has a negative effect on LEV 
T has a positive effect on LEV 
Growth 
(G) 
D H0: 
HA: 
G has a negative effect on LEV 
G has a positive effect on LEV 
G has a positive effect on LEV 
G has a negative effect on LEV 
Liquidity 
(L) 
E H0: 
HA: 
L has a negative effect on LEV 
L has a positive effect on LEV 
 
NDTS F H0: 
HA: 
 NDTS has a positive effect on LEV 
NDTS has a negative effect on LEV 
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Chapter 4: ANALYSIS 
This chapter will begin with a descriptive analysis of the data, then a correlation analysis 
will be conducted, followed by the choice of estimation model. It will continue presenting 
the empirical results obtained from analysing the effect different firm-specific 
determinants may have on capital structure in listed Norwegian firms. The analysis is 
based on the specifications discussed in the previous chapter. The findings will then be 
presented before they are compared and contrasted to the established theories and 
previous empirical research presented in chapter 2. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics is used to describe the basic features of the data in an empirical 
research paper. They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. 
Table 6 presents information for 2007-2013 regarding the number of observations, 
mean, standard deviation and maximum- and minimum values for the variables.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev Min. Max. 
Leverage at book value 630 0.3570 0.2219 0 1.6920 
Leverage at market value 630 0.3384 0.2329 0 1.3446 
Profitability 630 0.0568 0.2298 -2.3457 0.7772 
Size 630 14.2257 2.3826 0 20.3747 
Tangibility 630 0.3884 0.3033 0 1.5448 
Growth 630 1.8478 6.1192 -13.5409 142.639 
Liquidity 630 1.9675 3.2724 0.02251 65.3898 
No-debt Tax shield 630 0.0548 0.0528 0 0.6750 
 
Looking at the independent variables, some key values stand out from the table. 
Especially the growth and liability variables have large gaps between the minimum and 
maximum values accompanied by a large standard deviation. These values may 
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indicate that the dataset should be corrected for extreme values. As the time period 
studied includes the financial crisis in 2007-08, this may explain some of the outliers, 
as it does not reflect the true characteristics of firms over time. 
The median is the middle observation after the observations have been ranged and is 
not as sensitive to extreme values as the mean. For book value, the median is 0.336, 
while it for market value is 0.311 between 2007 and 2013. This suggests that the assets 
are primarily financed through equity, implying that firms have more equity available 
to meet their financial obligations. The difference in annual median value for book and 
market leverage over time is graphically illustrated in figure 5. 
 
Figure 3:  Median values of Leverage over time 
The above figure show that the median values for book value generally have been 
larger and less variable than market value over the time period. The explanation lies in 
market value depending on the market price, which continuously fluctuates and 
follows the business cycles. Besides, the market value of shares is usually higher than 
book value, so the difference between the measurements was expected. 
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4.1.2 Outliers in the data set 
An outlier is generally a data point that is far outside the norm for a variable or 
population. The descriptive statistics suggests that it is appropriate to eliminate some 
outliers in the data, as it can undermine the results of the analysis. According to 
Osborne and Overbay (2004) the effect of including outliers in the analysis may 
involve: 
1. Increased error variance and reduced explanatory power of statistical tests 
2. Decreased normality 
3. Biased estimates that may be of substantive interest 
There are several different approaches in how to handle the problem with outliers. One 
can choose to take a passive approach and keep them; alternatively the outliers can be 
removed or changed.  Based on the descriptive statistics, the most significant outliers 
are removed from the dataset. The outliers are identified in STATA, and then dropped 
accordingly.  
4.1.3 Descriptive statistics after removing outliers 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics after removing extreme observations in the 
dataset. The dataset can now be described as unbalanced as removing some 
estimations makes for an uneven distribution of N and T. The average value for all the 
variables remain roughly the same, except for growth and liquidity. These variables 
had the most significant outliers, so the expected change in mean would therefore also 
be large. The standard deviation for all the variables have been reduced as the gap 
between the minimum and maximum values has decreased, but profitability and size 
also have a slightly more significant change than the other variables.  
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics after removal of outliers 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev Min. Max. 
Leverage at book value 587 0.3556 0.2017 0 0.9719 
Leverage at market value 587 0.3459 0.2286 0 1.2029 
Profitability 587 0.0655 0.1655 -0.9023 0.4910 
Size 587 14.3093 2.0045 6.1312 19.9517 
Tangibility 587 0.3951 0.3023 0 1.5448 
Growth 587 1.5933 1.6584 -0.6249 15.5413 
Liquidity 587 1.7166 1.2821 0.0605 8.8682 
No-debt Tax shield 587 0.04918 0.03601 0 0.1967 
  
 
Leverage at Book Value  
In the sample, leverage at book value has a mean of 0.3556. This implies that around 
35.5% of the average firm’s total assets are financed by debt. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
got an average leverage at book value of 0.29, which indicates that the companies in 
this sample are slightly more leveraged than the US companies they researched. 
However Kouki and Said (2012) got a mean leverage at book value of 0.51 on their 
study of French firms. 
Leverage at Market Value 
The average leverage at market value is 0.3459, which indicates that the average 
company in this sample have a debt level of 34.6% of their market value. In 
comparison Frank and Goyal (2009) got a mean of 0.28. The standard deviation of 0.22 
is larger than for book value of leverage, which implies that the sample variations are 
larger than for market value.  
Profitability 
Profitability have a mean of 6.55% which can be considered considerably higher than 
the mean of 2% found in the research conducted by Frank and Goyal (2009). However, 
they used EBITDA/sales as a proxy for profitability. Song (2005) got a profitability 
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mean of 8% and a standard deviation of 0.28. Both values a higher than for this sample, 
indicating that profitability is higher, but with more variability in Swedish firms. 
Size 
The proxy for size in this sample is the logarithm of sales. As a result, the mean, 
maximum and minimum statistics makes little economic sense. However a standard 
deviation of 2.3826 indicates large differences in size between the companies in this 
sample. 
Tangibility 
This variable has an average of 0.395. This is slightly higher than the average of 0.35 
that Frank and Goyal (2009) discovered in their research. In comparison, Song (2005) 
got a tangibility ratio mean of 0.288, which is over 0.1 lower than for this sample. 
Furthermore he got a standard deviation of 0.22, which is significantly lower than the 
standard deviation of 0.30 from this sample. 
Growth 
Growth has an average of 1.84, which indicates that the market expects future growth 
for the companies included in the sample. This is similar to the mean of 1.74 found by 
Frank and Goyal (2009), but higher than the mean discovered by Song (2005) of 1.07. 
Liquidity 
This variable has a mean of 1.71 and it can be interpreted as how much the average 
company is able to pay off its obligations. Thus for every 1 of current liabilities, firms 
have 1.71 of current assets to cover their short-term liabilities. Ozkan (2001) achieved 
a liquidity ratio of 1.64, which indicates that Norwegian firms are slightly better at 
meeting their short-term obligations. If the ratio is under 1, firms should be concerned, 
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as the current liabilities will outweigh their current asset. The variable has a standard 
deviation of 1.28, which is reasonable. The value of the ratio is therefore relatively 
close around the mean.  
Non-Debt tax Shield 
Non-debt tax shield has a mean of 0.49. This result is slightly lower compared to a 
mean of 0.055 obtained from Song (2005). The same applies to the standard deviation 
from his research, which is 0.048 and about 0.012 higher than what can be detected in 
this sample. 
 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
A correlation analysis presents the pair wise correlation between all the variables that 
are included in the regression analysis. The null-hypothesis is that there is no 
correlation between the variables. Table 9 presents the correlation matrix and gives an 
overview of the correlation coefficient of the variables.  
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix 
 Blev Mlev Prof Size Tang Grow Liq Ndts 
Blev 1.0000        
Mlev 0.9029 1.0000       
Prof -0.0001 -0.0433 1.0000      
Size -0.0387 -0.0133 0.2125 1.0000     
Tang 0.6666 0.6658 0.1409 0.0232 1.0000    
Grow -0.1573 -0.4283 -0.0167 -0.0616 -0.1915 1.0000   
Liq -0.3003 -0.3220 -0.1652 -0.2382 -0.3133 0.1250 1.0000  
Ndts 0.0043 -0.0116 0.0399 0.0154 0.1279 0.0806 -0.1256 1.0000 
 
 
Using panel data for the regression analysis eliminates most of the effect of collinearity 
between variables. However this will still cause problems if one or more variables are 
close to perfect collinearity. Table 9 shows that this is not a concern as the correlation 
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between most of the variables are relatively low. The correlation between tangibility 
and the debt measures are moderately correlated, which means that there is a linear 
relationship between them. As expected, there is strong correlation between book 
value of leverage and market value of leverage because of the similar definitions.  
 
4.3 Evaluation of Estimation Model  
This section will evaluate what estimation model is the most appropriate to use. Firstly 
a pooled OLS regression analysis will be conducted and the data will be examined to 
see if it fulfils the assumptions of the discussed estimation models from the previous 
chapter.  Then the sample will be tested for panel data effects to see if panel data 
estimation methods are more appropriate. All the assumptions will be tested and 
discussed before the estimation model is chosen. 
4.3.1 OLS regression Analysis 
An OLS regression analysis was conducted on the two models, one with book value of 
leverage as the dependent variable and the other with market value of leverage.  
          Blev  = 0 + 1  profit + 2  sizeit + 3  tangit + 4  growit 
             + 5  liqit + 6  ndtsit + it 
 
 
                          Mlev = 0 + 1  profit + 2  sizeit + 3  tangit + 4  growit 
                 + 5  liqit + 6  ndtsit + it 
 
Table 8: Pooled OLS regression results 
Variables 1: Book-value of leverage  2: Market value of leverage 
profitability -0.1185557** -0.1945976*** 
size -0.0065745* -0.0054111 
tangibility 0.431606*** 0.4482379*** 
growth -0.0016718 -0.0403105 
liquidity -0.0226829*** -0.0253397*** 
Non-debt tax shield -0.5019125** -0.4728972** 
_cons 0.3531473 0.3891353 
Where P >t:    p < 0.05 = *, p < 0.01 = ** and p < 0.001 = *** 
Observations 587 586 
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F 88.30 131.49 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.4774 0.5767 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4720 0.5724 
 
 
4.2.1.1 ANOVA results 
The values for F and Prob > F indicates whether or not the regression model is 
significant. Specifically, they test the null hypothesis that all of the regression 
coefficients are equal to zero. For both models, Prob > F is equal to 0.000, which means 
that we can reject H0 and conclude that the model is significant. The F-value is the 
explained variability divided by the unexplained variability. In these models the F-
value is 88.30 and 131.49, respectively. The higher the F-value, the more of the total 
variability is accounted for in the model.  
R-squared measures the explanatory power of the model and indicates how the 
variance in the dependent variable (Y) can be explained by the independent variables 
(X) (Koop, 2013).  The results show that the model with book value as the dependent 
variable is equal to 0.4720, while using market value gives a significantly higher R-
squared of 0.5724. This means that for model 1, 47.20% of the variation in leverage at 
book value can be explained by the significant independent variables. For model 2, 
57.24% of the variation in market value can be explained by the significant 
independent variables. 
4.2.1.2 Interpretation of coefficients 
The table shows that there are some differences in the magnitude of the coefficients 
between having book value as the independent variable compared market value. When 
interpreting the coefficients, all other variables are kept constant (ceteris paribus). 
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Profitability 
Model 1: Book Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between book value of leverage and profit. When 
EBITDA/Total assets increases by 1 percentage point, book-leverage decreases by 0.11 
percentage points. The coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level. 
Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
The regression obtained a negative relationship between market value of leverage and 
profitability. The results indicate that when profitability increases with 1 percentage 
point, market value of leverage decreases with 0.19 percentage points. 
 
Size 
Model 1: Book Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between size and book value of leverage. When size 
increases by 1 percentage point, book value of leverage decreases by 0.006 percentage 
points. The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. 
Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between size and market value of leverage. When size 
increases by 1 percentage point, market value of leverage decreases by 0.005 
percentage points. However, the results suggest that the variable is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5%, 1% or the 0.1% significance level. 
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Tangibility 
Model 1: Book Value of Leverage 
There is a positive relationship between book value of leverage and tangibility. The 
results indicate that when the ratio fixed assets/total assets increases with 1 
percentage point, book value of leverage increases by 0.43 percentage point. 
Economically, this is a strong positive relationship between the variables. Tangibility is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.1% significance level. 
Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
There is a positive relationship between market value of leverage and tangibility. The 
results indicate that when the tangibility ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book 
value of leverage increases by 0.44 percentage points. Tangibility is significantly 
different from zero at the 0.1% significance level. 
 
Growth 
Model 1: Book Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between growth and book value of leverage and a 1% 
percentage point increase will result in a 0.0016 decrease in book value of leverage. 
Growth is not significantly different from zero at the 5%, 1% or 0.1% significance level 
Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between growth and market value of leverage. The 
results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the growth variable will cause a 
0.04 decrease in market value of leverage. However, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5%, 1% or 0.1% significance level 
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Liquidity 
Model 1: Book Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between book value of leverage and liquidity. The 
results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the liquidity ratio will lead to a 
decrease in book value of leverage of 0.022 percentage points. 
Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between liquidity and market value of leverage. A 1 
percentage point increase in the liquidity ratio will result in a 0.025 decrease in the 
market value of leverage 
 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 
Model 1: Book Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and the book value of 
leverage. A one percentage point increase in the ratio depreciation/total assets may 
lead to a 0.5 percentage point decrease in the book value of leverage. This can be 
considered an economically strong negative relationship. The variable is significant at 
the 1% significance level 
Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and the market value of 
leverage. The results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio 
depreciation/total assets causes a 0.5 percentage point decrease in the book value of 
leverage. The variable is significant at the 1% significance level 
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4.2.2 Test of assumptions 
Because this study uses a panel dataset, the assumptions for OLS will be tested in order 
to determine if the regression results are reliable. If not, further analysis should be 
conducted using either a FE-model or a RE-model. 
 
Linearity 
The estimation model assumes that the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is linear. If a linear regression model is fitted to variables that 
do not have a linear relationship with the dependent variable, the results can be 
flawed. Perfect linearity is rarely existent in empirical research, but non-linearity 
should be examined and detected as it can indicate that variables should have a 
different functional form. Appendix B1 provides scatter plot of the variables against the 
residuals. Some outliers are detected in the linear relationships, but all the variables 
provide a satisfactory degree of linearity. 
 
Normality 
Normality in the residuals is necessary in order to conduct valid hypothesis testing 
because is assures us that the p-values for the t-statistics and the F-test is reliable.  The 
two most common ways to test the assumption of normality is by conducting a 
skewness/kurtosis test or creating a kernel density estimate followed by pnorm and 
qnorm plots. The first test is numerically, while the latter tests illustrate the issue 
graphically. 
 
The skewness/kurtosis test (sktest) test measures skewness and excess kurtosis to 
test for normality. The null hypothesis states that there is no significant departure from 
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normality in the data. Table 11 shows that we can accept the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level and conclude that the data fits the normal distribution 
Table 9: Skewness/Kurtosis test for Normality 
Variable obs Skewness Kurtosis chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Residuals (r) 586 0.8957 0.1655 1.94 0.3783 
 
The Kernel density estimate tests for normality in the residuals for the regression 
model. The Kernel density plot in appendix B2 shows that the residuals are 
approximately normally distributed.  
In addition to the Kernel density estimate, a standard normal probability plot (pnorm) 
and a quantile normal distribution plot (qnorm) are used to further examine the 
assumption of normality. While pnorm is sensitive to non-normality in the middle 
range of the data, the qnorm is sensitive to non-normality near the tails. The results are 
presented in appendix E, and show that pnorm provides no evidence of non-normality. 
However qnorm shows a slight deviation from normality in the upper tail. This 
deviation is considered small, so the conclusion is that the assumption of normality 
holds in the model. 
Heteroscedasticity 
Presence of heteroscedasticity can have massive implications for the model as it can 
lead to wrong computation of the standard errors in the analysis and thus the wrong 
conclusion about the results. The model is first tested for heteroscedasticity by using 
the Breusch-Pagan test, where we test the null hypothesis that there is 
homoscedasticity of errors.  
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Table 10: Breusch-Pagan test 
Model chi2 (1) Prob > chi2 
Book value 1.25 0.2634 
Market value 1.22  0.2695 
 
Both models have values above 0.05, thus we accept the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level and we conclude that we do not have heteroscedasticity in either 
model. It is common do also conduct a Cameron and Trivedi test, as this takes into 
account certain factors that the Breusch-Pagan test ignores. 
 
Table 11: Cameron and Trivedi test 
 Book value Market value 
Source Chi2 df p Chi2 df p 
Heteroscedasticity 58.38 27 0.0004 148.03 27 0.0000 
Skewness 24.80 6 0.0004 99.12 6 0.0000 
Kurtosis 10.02 1 0.3118 1.20 1 0.2741 
Total 82.49 34 0.000 248.35 34 0.000 
 
Based on these test results, we have to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level and 
conclude that there are elements of heteroscedasticity present.  
 
Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation in the regression can be detected by using a Breusch-
Godfrey/Wooldridge test. The null hypothesis is that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation.  
 
Table 12: Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test 
Model F (1, 85) Prob > F 
Book value 27.264 0.0000 
Market value 17.211 0.0001 
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Both models have a probability below 0.05, this means that we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% significance level and conclude that we have a presence of 
autocorrelation. 
Multicollinearity 
According to Brooks (2008), the presence of multicollinearity usually does not have a 
significant effect on the overall result because a small degree of correlation will not 
significantly influence the estimation. Even thought section 7.4.1 did not indicate a 
strong correlation between any of the independent variables, a variable inflation test 
(VIF) is conducted in order to make sure that there is no multicollinearity in the data.  
 
Table 13: VIF-test 
Variable VIF 
Liquidity 1.20 
Tangibility 1.17 
Size 1.10 
Profitability 1.08 
Growth 1.06 
No-debt tax shield 1.04 
Mean VIF 1.11 
 
As a general rule, multicollinearity may be a problem if the mean VIF is above 10. In 
this case, the mean VIF is 1.11 and we can conclude that there is no multicollinearity in 
the model.  
4.2.3 Panel data effects 
As the two models violate the assumptions of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, it 
is necessary to test for panel data effects.  
 
The Lagrange multiplier test 
The Lagrange multiplier (LM) test helps decide if a simple OLS regression can be used 
for analysis of panel data. The null hypothesis tested is that the cross-sectional 
 53 
variance across all components is zero, i.e. that there is no significant difference across 
units and thus no panel effects.  
 
Table 14: Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Model Chi2 (1) Prob > Chi2 
Book value 663.43 0.0000 
Market value 579.80 0.0000 
 
For both book value of leverage and market value of leverage, the probability is below 
0.05. Hence the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level and there is 
significant evidence of differences across entities. This indicates that an effects model 
should be used instead of OLS. 
 
Hausman test 
In order to decide between the fixed or the random effects model, a Hausman test is 
conducted where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effect. That 
means that the unique errors (ui) are not correlated with the regressors. 
 
Table 15: Hausman Test 
Model Chi2 (6) Prob > Chi2 
Book value 6.18 0.4038 
Market value 11.25 0.0810 
 
For both book value and market value of leverage the probability is above 0.05 (not 
significant). Hence we accept the null hypothesis at the 5% significant level and 
conclude that the random effects model should be applied.  
4.2.4 Diagnostics results 
The dataset fulfils the assumptions of linearity, normality and no multicollinearity, 
while autocorrelation and indications of heteroscedasticity are identified. Based on the 
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discussion in section 3.2, the model has been examined for panel data effects. 
Significant panel data effects where discovered, which indicates that either a fixed 
effects model or a random effects model should be used.  
The decision between which one to use was decided after conducting a Hausman test. 
This test examines whether the coefficients from the fixed effects estimation or the 
random effects estimation are the most statistically significant.  With both book value 
and market value as the dependent variable, no significant correlation between the 
individual specific residual term and independent variables where found. This 
suggested that the random effects model was more appropriate to use. Results from 
the OLS regression and the fixed effects regression along with a comparison can be 
found in appendix F. Following the discussion on the RE-model from section 3.2.4, the 
GLS-estimator will be used in the preceding analysis. 
 
4.3 Random Effects Regression 
This analysis will explore how firm-specific factors affects firms’ level of leverage by 
using a random effect model. Interpreting the coefficients in a RE model is slightly 
different from the basic OLS because the coefficients include both the within-entity and 
the between-entity effects. When interpreting the results, the coefficient will represent 
the average effect of the independent variables (xi, 1,2,,k )  
over leverage, when x changes across time and between firms by one percentage point. 
This means that the random effects regression does not only predict change over time, 
but will also take into account the difference between units. 
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A cluster robust regression has to be conducted because of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation detected in the dataset. Because this dataset 
contains relatively small time-variables (T) compared to unit-variables (N), clustering 
will effectively make standard errors robust to any kind of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. Furthermore it is determined that coefficients would be analysed at 
the 5% significance level. Results from the RE regression is presented below in table 
16. 
 
Table 16: Robust Random Effects regression 
Variables 1: Book-value of leverage  2: Market value of leverage 
profitability -0.1390454* 
(0.0568) 
-0.169078*** 
(0.0482) 
size -0.0038564 
(0.0038) 
-0.0013304 
(0.0039) 
tangibility 0.4587378*** 
(0.0502) 
0.4501003*** 
(0.0419) 
growth 0.0090431 
(0.0069) 
-0.0261529*** 
(0.0076) 
liquidity -0.0163805** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0247853*** 
(0.0070) 
Non-debt tax shield -0.4880205 
(0.3075) 
-0.3496479 
(0.3048) 
_cons 0.2755688 
(0.0668) 
0.29749 
(0.0700) 
Where:     p < 0.05 = *, p < 0.01 = ** and p < 0.001 = ***, cluster robust std.errors in ( ) 
 within 0.2942 0.3672 
R-sq between 0.5428 0.6418 
 overall 0.4681 0.5659 
Obs 586 586 
Wald chi2 (6) 144.58 241.45 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 
Sigma_u 0.11776774 0.11531709 
Sigma_e 0.08818594 0.09212662 
Rho 0.64072996 0.61041179 
 
The values for chi2 and Prob > chi2 indicates whether or not the regression model is 
significant. It is an F-test that tests the null hypothesis that all of the regression 
coefficients are equal to zero. For both models, Prob > chi2 is equal to 0.000, which 
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means that we can reject H0 and conclude that the model is significant and all 
coefficients are different fro zero.  
Sigma_u and sigma_e in table 16 respectively represents the standard deviation of 
random effects and random errors. The former is slightly higher for book value, while 
the latter is higher for market value. Rho represents the intraclass correlation in the 
models. For model 1, 64% of the fraction of variance is caused by random effects, while 
random effects for model 2 cause 61% of variance. 
4.3.1 Differences Between Book- and Market Value of Leverage 
 
R-squared measures the explanatory power of the model. The GLS estimator is a 
weighted average of between and within estimators, thus the overall R-squared tells us 
how much the variance in capital structure can be explained by firm-specific 
characteristic. The R-squared values in table 16, indicates that the variation in market 
value of leverage is better explained by the independent variables than for book value 
of leverage. The regression gives an R2 of 0.468 for model 1, which means that 46.8% 
of the variation in book value of leverage can be explained by the independent 
variables. In comparison, model 2 reports an R2 of 0.566, implying that 56.6% of the 
variation in market value of leverage can be explained by the independent variables. 
This shows that it is a large difference between the models and the independent 
variables’ ability to explain variation across firms. Conclusively the independent 
variables are able to explain 10% more of the variation in market value of leverage 
than for book value.  
4.3.2 Firm-specific Effect on Capital Structure 
In this section, the results from the coefficients will be analysed and discussed in order 
to determine the effect of the chosen firm-specific factors on capital structure. 
 57 
4.3.2.1 Profitability 
The profitability-variable is significant at the 5% significance level for book value of 
leverage as the independent variable, while it is significant at the 0.1% level for market 
value. For both models, profitability is negative, which indicates that firms with higher 
returns tend to have lower levels of leverage. The results suggest that a 1 percentage 
point increase in profitability will lead to a 0.139 percentage point decrease in book 
value of leverage. For model 2, a one percent percentage point increase in profitability 
will result in a 0.169 percentage point decrease in the market value of leverage. 
The two theories provide different views on the effect profitability have on leverage. 
The pecking order theory assumes an inverse relationship between profitability and 
leverage. Hence more profitable firms will use less leverage because they will use 
retained earnings as funding instead of external debt. In contrast, the trade off theory 
believes that profitable companies will shield their profits from tax, and thus borrow 
more than less profitable firms. The fact that both theories suggest a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability is consistent with the results from 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) Song (2005), Frank and Goyal 
(2004) among others. A positive relationship is rarely supported by recent empirical 
studies. 
4.3.2.2 Size 
For both models, size is not significantly different from zero at the 5% significance 
level. This implies that size is not a factor when firms determine their capital structure 
in Norwegian companies. This result deviate from previous empirical research from 
Frank and Goyal (2004) who provide results suggesting that size is significant, 
indicating that larger firms tend to have higher debt levels.  
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The insignificance of this factor stands in contrast to the Trade-off theory that claims 
that size matters, as larger firms tend to add more debt because of a lower probability 
of default. The pecking order theory justifies the expectation of a positive relationship 
between size and leverage with a lower degree of information asymmetry, as this will 
give companies better opportunities and conditions to gain access to credit.   
4.3.2.3 Tangibility 
Tangibility is the most explanatory factor for both models. The coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level and it has a positive relationship with 
firm leverage. The results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the tangibility 
ratio will result in a 0.458 increase in book value of leverage and a 0.450 increase in 
the market value of leverage respectively.  
The result is supported by both theories, which expects a positive relationship 
between tangibility and leverage. The pecking order theory explains that information 
asymmetry will be lower for firms with more tangible assets, resulting in more debt. 
However Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the pecking order theory indicate a 
negative relationship between tangibility and debt. They state that firms with few 
tangible assets will have greater asymmetry problems, and as a result, the coefficient 
should not be significantly different form zero. The trade off theory expects a positive 
relationship between tangibility and debt because a higher degree of asset tangibility 
leads to lower bankruptcy costs.  
 
The results and the views of the theories are supported by a large amount of empirical 
research. Song (2005) found that tangibility is positively related to total debt ratio at 
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the 0.1% significance level. Noulas & Genimakis (2011) and Nunkoo & Boateng (200) 
also found a significantly positive effect of tangibility on leverage. 
4.3.2.4 Growth 
Growth has a negative relationship with book value of leverage and a positive 
relationship with market value of leverage. The variable is not significantly different 
from zero when using book value of leverage as the dependent variable, but the 
opposite is the case for market value of leverage, where the coefficient is significant at 
the 0.1% significance level. A 1 percentage point increase in the growth ratio will result 
in a 0.026 percentage point decrease in market value of leverage.  
If a company has a lot of growth opportunities, the cost of bankruptcy and financial 
distress will be considerably higher (Titman & Wessels, 1988). With this in mind, the 
trade-off theory suggests a negative relationship between growth and leverage. This is 
mainly because firms with prospects of growth are likely to have lower earnings before 
tax, and they are therefore not be able to take advantage of the interest tax shield 
associated with a high debt ratio. In addition, growing firms are likely to appreciate 
financial flexibility, and thus preferably a lower debt ratio. 
Ozkan (2001) achieved a negative effect of growth on leverage. He concludes that 
growing firms often have a large proportion of intangible assets, and may therefore not 
be able to support a high leverage ratio. Furthermore firms with growth opportunities 
tend to have lower debt levels because debt holders fear that the firm might pass up on 
investment opportunities. The results are also consistent with other empirical studies 
including Frank & Goyal (2007), Rajan & Zingales (1995), Shah & Khan (2007) and 
Nunkoo & Boateng (2011). In comparison, Noulas & Genimakis (2011) find a positive 
relationship with growth and leverage explaining that firms choose to issue equity 
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when their market performance is high. Song (2005) discovers that growth is not 
related to total debt ratio. 
4.3.2.5 Liquidity 
Liquidity is significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level for book value 
of leverage and at the 0.1% significance level for market value of leverage. Both results 
indicate a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage, so that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the liquidity ratio will lead to a 0.016 decrease in book value of 
leverage and a 0.024 decrease in market value of leverage. In the pecking order theory, 
firms prefer internal to external financing, as a result they would create liquid reserves 
from retained earnings. If the liquid assets were sufficient in financing a firm’s 
investments, the firm would have no incentive to raise funds externally. Ozkan (2001) 
made the same discovery and suggested that the inverse relationship could be a result 
of potential conflicts between shareholders and debt holders of the company. Sbeiti 
(2010) also found the liquidity coefficient to be negative, while Olayinka (2011)’s 
results suggest a positive relation between leverage and liquidity. 
4.3.2.6 Non-debt tax shield 
The results show that there is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and 
leverage for both models. However, the variable is not significantly different from zero 
at the 5% significance level. Despite that the variable is not a determining factor for 
Norwegian companies in defining their capital structure, the negative relationship is 
consistent with the trade-off theory. Mazur (2007) got the same results for Polish 
companies, while Heshmati (2001) and Ozkan (2001) found non-debt tax shield to be 
significant and inversely related to debt. 
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4.3.3 How well do the pecking order and the trade off theory explain the findings? 
The last research objective was to determine if the capital structure of the firms 
included in this study can be explained by established theories of capital structure. In 
order to decide which theory provide the most accurate predictions, the nature of the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables where examined. 
Table 17 provides a summary of the theoretical hypothesis mentioned in section 3.4 
and is based on the regression analysis from table 16. 
 
Table 17: Test of Hypothesis 
Variable Trade-off  Pecking Order  Results: BLEV  Results: MLEV  
Profitability ( + ) ( - ) ( - )* ( - )*** 
Size ( + ) ( - )           ( - ) ( - ) 
Tangibility ( + ) ( + ) ( + )*** ( + )*** 
Growth ( - ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - )*** 
Liquidity / ( - ) ( - )** ( - )*** 
NDTS ( - ) / ( - ) ( - ) 
 
 
For book value of leverage, four of the independent variables predicts a negative 
relationship, while tangibility and growth reports a positive relationship with book 
value of leverage. When using market value of leverage as the dependent variable, all 
the variables except from tangibility predict a negative relationship. Hence, how 
growth is affecting leverage is differing between the models.  
The results obtained for book value of leverage supports the pecking order theory. This 
implies that the Norwegian firms in the sample prefer internal financing to finance 
investments rather than debt. In terms of the trade-off theory, there is a positive 
relationship with tangibility and a negative relationship with non-debt tax shield. As a 
result, the trade-off theory does not get much support, which implies that firms do not 
consider the trade off between the costs and benefits of using debt financing.  
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For market value of leverage, the relationship with four of the variables can be 
explained by the pecking order theory, while three is the case for the trade off theory. 
This implies that both theories too some degree can explain how firm-characteristics 
affect the market value of leverage. 
Based on the random effects regression analysis, three of the independent variables 
are significant for book value of leverage, while four is significant for the market value 
of leverage. The relationships that are not statistically significant are size and non-debt 
tax shield for both models and growth for book value of leverage. Although these 
coefficients are not significant in the models, the nature of these relationships may still 
provide insight into which theory is better at explaining capital structure for the 
sample. Taking this into account, the pecking order theory gains support in model 1, 
while none of the theories are fully able to predict the obtained results for model 2. The 
latter is the case for most previous studies that have questioned the explanatory power 
of the theories, suggesting that one is not superior to the other.  
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION 
This chapter will provide a conclusion for this paper by presenting the most important 
findings together with results regarding the research objectives.  Then the limitations of 
this study will be discussed before some recommendations for future research is 
presented 
5.1. Summary 
Ever since Miller and Modigliani (1958) proposed the irrelevance of capital structure 
for firm value, several theories explaining the opposite have been developed. The two 
most prominent being, the trade off theory and the pecking order theory. The trade off 
theory stresses that the choice of capital structure is a result of a trade off between the 
benefits and costs of debt. The debt tax shield represent an advantage, while the costs 
of debt include financial distress and bankruptcy costs. In contrast, the pecking order 
theory advances that firms follow a pecking order of financing. Because of information 
asymmetry, firms will prefer internal to external funding and debt over equity. A 
variety of studies on this topic have been conducted for different countries and with 
different determinants. However few has focused on the capital structure decision in 
Norwegian firms. The main purpose of this study was therefore to try and fill the gap in 
the existing literature and hopefully provide some useful information about the 
determinants of capital structure of Norwegian firms.  
Based on the overall aim of this study, the following objectives where formulated: 
 Analyse whether firm-specific characteristics can explain the variation in capital 
structure across Norwegian firms. 
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 Determine if book value of leverage and market value of leverage produce 
different results. 
 Look at the dominant theories of capital structure and examine if the trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory can explain the observed capital structure 
of Norwegian firms.  
Based on previous empirical research, six firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure where identified; profitability, size, growth, tangibility, liquidity and non-
debt tax shield. While the first four factors can be linked to both the pecking order and 
the trade off theory, liquidity is significant for the pecking order theory, while the non-
debt tax shield is given special attention in the trade off theory. This study comprises 
firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange over a time period of 7 years from 2007-2013. 
The data was collected from DataStream and firms had to have reported financial data 
for the entire time period. As a result, the data set included a total of 90 firms 
representing 587 complete observations for firm characteristics.  
Firstly, a preliminary analysis was conducted, starting with descriptive statistics of the 
data. This uncovered that the data set contained outliers that could possibly bias the 
results and the significance of the regression model. After removing some extreme 
values, different descriptive measurements were analysed, including mean, standard 
deviation and range. The descriptive statistics were followed by correlation analysis, 
before the estimation models where analysed. As the data set can be characterised as 
panel data, basic OLS regression may not predict reasonable results and either Random 
effects or fixed effects should be used. After testing the OLS assumptions and testing 
for panel data effects, it was concluded that a random effects estimation model would 
 65 
be the most appropriate way to analyse the data.  After conducting and analysing the 
regression, there was made an attempt to answer the identified research objectives. 
 
5.2 Main findings, implications and concluding remarks 
This section will provide the conclusions and implications in relations to the overall 
aim of this paper and the identified research objectives. 
5.2.1 The effect of firm characteristics on capital structure 
The R2 values for both models yielded reasonably high values. The results predicted 
that the independent variables are able to explain 46.8% of the variance for model 1 
(book value) and 56.6% for model 2 (market value).  
The significant variables for book value of leverage were profitability, tangibility and 
liquidity. Profitability and liquidity had a negative relationship with leverage. This 
indicates that firms with higher returns and the capability of converting their assets 
into cash have reduced need for leverage. Tangibility got a positive relationship with 
leverage, presumably because tangible assets can serve as collateral for debt. The 
model using market value of leverage produced four significant variables, including 
profitability, tangibility, growth and liquidity. The relationship with the three common 
variables are the same, however, the values of the coefficients are larger and have a 
stronger statistical significance than for book value of leverage. In fact, the four 
variables are all significantly different from zero at the 0.1% significance level. The 
growth variable has a negative relationship with leverage, indicating that growing 
firms have less debt than mature ones. 
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From the result, it may be concluded that tangibility is the most important firm 
characteristic to consider when making financing decisions, followed by profitability 
and liquidity.  
5.2.2 The difference between book value and market value of leverage 
In this research, the debt to equity ratio is the dependent variable and it is used to 
quantify capital structure. This measurement can be based on book values or market 
values. As there has been continuous discussion in the literature over what the most 
preferable measurement is, this study has used both in order to examine whether or 
not there is a difference between them.  
The R2 obtained from the regression analysis reported that the variation in market 
value of leverage is better explained by the independent variables, than book value of 
leverage. The variation in the independent variables explains 56.6% of the variation in 
market value as opposed to only 46.8% of book value of equity, a variation of over 
10%. Additionally, there are more significant variables for market value than for book 
value. Hence, the results indicate that there are differences between the two 
measurements of leverage. This may imply that Norwegian firms should focus more on 
market value, as this provided a significantly stronger result. 
5.2.3 How well does established theories explain capital structure in Norwegian firms 
The results obtained from using book value of leverage as the independent variable, 
can fully be explained by the pecking order theory. This implies that listed Norwegian 
firms prefer internal over external leverage and that variations in capital structure can 
be explained by a firms’ cash flow, rather than the trade off between the costs and 
benefits of debt. Market value of leverage on the other hand, did not produce the same 
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results. The regression estimations did not lead to a conclusion on the superiority of 
one of the theories, but included predictions from both. 
 
5.3 Limitations to the study 
The time period covered in this study and the sample size could be a limitation, 
especially considering that some of the estimators may suffer from small finite sample 
biases (Bryman & Bell, 2007). However, validating the results by performing different 
tests has mitigated this problem. There was an option to increase the time period 
covered in this study, but as companies may change their behaviour over longer time 
periods, this could also potentially bias the results.  
The data sample in this study consisted of a total of 90 firms listed on the Oslo stock 
exchange.  By focusing solely on listed firms for the time period of the study, the 
research may have been exposed to survivorship bias (Bryman & Bell, 2007).  In order 
to reduce the possibility of this type of bias, the study should have included firms that 
where delisted during the selected period.  
For this research, six firm-specific determinant of capital were identified and analysed. 
However, there is a large set of possible variables that may influence the capital 
structure decisions made by firms. For practical reasons it is difficult, if not impossible 
to identify them all, especially as some of them are hard to measure, such as 
management style.  
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5.4 Recommendations for future research 
In this research the focus have been on firm-specific determinants of capital structure. 
For the future it may be interesting to examine the effect of macroeconomic factors 
including GDP growth, interest rates and other measures of market condition. If the 
market is struggling, investors may not give firms access to capital and the interest rate 
on debt may be higher that what the firm is willing to pay. These factors may also have 
an affect on the firm-specific determinants. Furthermore a cross-industry study could 
examine how capital structure varies across different industries. How it differs 
between the top industries in Norway, such as the energy, petroleum and shipping 
sector would be of particular importance. 
According to the trade-off theory, an optimal capital structure exists which reflects the 
costs and benefits of debt. As a result, firms should set a target debt ratio and 
continuously adjust their capital structure to meet the target. Future research on 
Norwegian firms can examine how firms set their target leverage ratios and how fast 
they are able to adjust their capital structure to the target. Ozkan (2011) among others 
researched this by creating a dynamic capital structure model.  
The results from this study show that the identified firm characteristics have an effect 
on capital structure. A recommendation for future research to survey the CFO’s of the 
firms included in the sample. This may provide an indication of why these specific 
factors affect capital structure and it may give an understanding of what managers 
consider when making capital structure decisions. Are they the same as the ones 
included in this study or are there other relevant factors they take into account when 
deciding on how the firm should be financed.  
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7. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Cost of Capital 
A1: Cost of capital under imperfect capital markets 
 
The figure below is from Eiteman et al. (2013) and provides an illustration of the 
transition from a domestic to a global marginal cost of capital. 
 
Source: Eiteman et al (2013), p. 38 
 
The figure shows that a multinational company has a given marginal return of capital 
at different budget levels, represented by the line MRR. Even if the firm expands it 
capital budget, it maintains its debt ratio so that financial risk does not change. If the 
firm is limited to raising its capital in the domestic market, the line MCCd shows the 
marginal domestic cost of capital at different budget levels. The optimal budget in the 
domestic case is where MCCd meets MRR. If the firm gets access to addition funds 
outside its domestic capital market, the marginal cost of capital will shift to MCCf. As 
MCCf meets MRR at a lower point, the firm will get a lower marginal cost of capital, 
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while having increased its capital budget. As a result of the combined effects of greater 
availability of capital and international pricing of the firms securities, the marginal cost 
declines and the capital expenditure budget gets extended even further where MCCW 
crosses MRR.  
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Appendix B: Past Studies 
B.1 Past Empirical Research 
 
Below is a table over some previous empirical studies that have been analysed in order 
to decide on which determinants of capital structure would be used in this paper. 
Table 1: Previous Empirical Research  
Author(s) Data Period Focus Sample 
Size 
Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
Ozkan 
(2001) 
1984-1996 Non-Financial 
UK firms 
390 
 
Profitability (-), Liquidity (-), 
Growth (-), Non-debt tax shield, 
Size (/) 
Heshmati 
(2001) 
1993-1998 Small Swedish 
firms 
2261 Profitability, Tangibility, Growth, 
Non-debt tax shield, Size, Age 
Bhaduri 
(2002) 
1989-1995 Indian firms in 
manufacturing 
363 Growth, Cash Flow, Size, 
Uniqueness, Industry 
Voulgaris et 
al. (2004) 
1989-1996 Greek firms in 
manufacturing 
218 Profitability, Size, Growth,  
Chen (2004) 1995-2000 Chinese-listed 
companies 
88 Profitability, Size, Growth, 
Tangibility 
Akhtar 
(2005) 
1992-2001 Australian 
companies 
835 Profitability, Growth, Size, 
Tangibility 
Shah & Khan 
(2007) 
1993-2002 Non-Financial 
Pakistani firms 
286 Profitability, Tangibility, Size, 
Growth, Volatility, Non-debt tax 
shield 
Mazur 
(2007) 
2000-2004 Polish 
companies 
238 Profitability, Growth, Size, 
Uniqueness, Asset structure, Non-
debt tax shield. 
Nunkoo & 
Boateng 
(2009) 
1996-2004 Non-Financial 
Canadian 
companies 
7098 Profitability, Tangibility, Size, 
Growth 
Sbeiti 
(2010) 
1998-2005 GCC country 
companies 
142 Profitability, Liquidity, Tangibility, 
Size, Growth 
Noulas & 
Genimakis 
(2011) 
1998-2006 Greek listed 
companies 
259 Profitability, Size, Growth, 
Tangibility, Volatility 
Olayinka 
(2011) 
1999-2007 Nigerian 
Companies 
66 Profitability, Growth, Liquidity, 
Tangibility, Size 
Gonzáles & 
Gonsáles 
(2012) 
1995-2003 Spanish 
Companies 
3439 Profitability, Tangibility, Growth, 
Non-debt tax shield,  
Source: Own contribution 
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Appendix C: Data Sample 
C.1 Companies included in the sample 
 
Table 18: Firm Sample 
AF GR. ASA  ELECTROMAGNETIC  ORKLA ASA 
AGR GROUP ASA ELTEK ASA  PETROLEUM GEO-SVCS  
AKER PHILADELPHIA  EVRY ASA  PETROLIA SE  
AKER SOLUTIONS ASA  FARSTAD SHIPPING ASA  PROSAFE SE 
AKVA GROUP ASA  FRED. OLSEN ENERGY PSI GROUP ASA 
AMERICAN SHIPPING CO GANGER ROLF ASA  Q-FREE ASA  
APPTIX ASA  GC RIEBER SHIPPING  REACH SUBSEA ASA 
AQUA BIO TECHNOLOGY GOODTECH ASA  REC SILICON ASA  
ARENDALS FOSSEKOMP. GRIEG SEAFOOD ASA  REM OFFSHORE ASA  
ATEA ASA GYLDENDAL ASA  REPANT ASA  
AUSTEVOLL SEAFOOD  HAFSLUND ASA  ROCKSOURCE ASA 
BELSHIPS ASA HAVFISK ASA  SALMAR ASA 
BERGEN GROUP ASA  HAVILA SHIPPING ASA SCANA INDUSTRIER ASA  
BIONOR PHARMA ASA HEXAGON COMPOSITES  SCHIBSTED ASA 
BLOM ASA HURTIGRUTEN ASA SEABIRD EXP  
BONHEUR ASA I.M. SKAUGEN ASA SEVAN MARINE 
BW OFFSHORE LTD INTEROIL EXPLORATION  SIEM SHIP 
BYGGMA ASA  KITRON ASA  SOLSTAD OFFSHORE ASA  
CECON ASA KONGSBERG AUTOMOTIV SOLVANG ASA  
CERMAQ ASA KONGSBERG GRUPPEN STATOIL ASA 
COMROD COMMUNICA  LEROY SEAFOOD GROUP TELENOR GROUP  
DEEP SEA SUPPLY PLC  MARINE HARVEST ASA  TELIO HOLDING  
DET NORSKE  NORSK HYDRO ASA  TGS-NOPEC GEOPHYSIC  
DIAGENIC ASA  NORSKE SKOGINDUST.  TIDE ASA  
DNO ASA NORTHERN OFFSHORE  TOMRA SYSTEMS ASA 
DOF ASA  NORWEGIAN AIR  TTS GROUP ASA 
DOLPHIN INTER  NORWEGIAN ENERGY  VEIDEKKE ASA 
DOMSTEIN ASA  NTS ASA  WILH WILHELMSEN 
EIDESVIK OFFSHORE OCEANTEAM ASA.  WILSON ASA 
EITZEN CHEMICAL ASA  ODFJELL ASA  YARA  
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Appendix D: Model Assumptions 
D.1 OLS Assumptions 
OLS assumptions collected from Koop (2013) and Kleinbaum et al. (2008): 
1. Linearity:  
This assumption states that the model can be written as: Yi = 0 + 1xi1 + 2xi2 + 
… + ikxik + I and it specifies a lineat relationship between y and x1, …,xk. This 
implies that a one unit change in the explanatory variable will have the same 
effect in the dependent variable regardless of the explanatory variable’s initial 
value. If there exists a non-linear relationship between variables, they should be 
changed to a proper functional form.  
2. Exogenity: 
This assumption can be expressed as: E i xj1, xj2,…, xjk = 0. This states that the 
expected value of error at observation I in the sample is not a function of the 
independent variables observed at any observation, including this one. This 
means that the independent variables will not have any useful information for 
prediction of the error term. 
3. Homoscedastic:  
This assumption states that the variance of y is the same for any fixed 
combination of the explanatory variables. It can be expressed as:  
VAR(y xi1, xi2, …, xik)= 2. If this assumption is not met, we cannot fully rely on 
the p-values of the regression coefficients. 
 
4. Nonautocorrelation 
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This assumption states that cov(t, s) = 0, where t  s. This means that the error 
terms from two different periods must be linearly unrelated. 
5. Not Stochastic 
This assumption states that observations on independent variables are fixed in 
repeated samples. This implies no measurement error in x and no serial 
correlation where a lagged value of y would be used as an independent variable. 
Finally there should be no simultaneity or endogenous independent variables. 
6. No Multicollinearity: 
This assumption states that none of the independent variables in the sample 
(xi1, xi2, …, xik) are constant and that there does not exist a perfect linear 
relationship between any of them. The problem with multicollinearity arises 
when some or all of the independent variables are highly correlated with one 
another. It reveals itself through low t-statistics and high p-values. If 
multicollinearity is present, the regression model has difficulty telling which 
explanatory variables are influencing the dependent variables.  
D.2 FE Assumptions 
1. The model should be linear in parameters and can be written as:  
Yit = (0 + ui) + Xit + vit 
2. There should be a random sample in the cross section 
3. The independent variables should not be constant over time: xi, 1,2,…,k  0 
4. There should not be a perfect linear relationship between the explanatory 
variables: Corr(xitj, xits) < 1, where s  t. 
5. The independent variables must be exogenous on the unobserved effect: 
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E(vit ui, xitj) = 0. Hence we control for the unobserved fixed parameter ui, so that 
Corr(xitj, uit) = 0 
6. The variance of the residuals on all explanatory variables should be constant: 
VAR(vit xitj) = 2. 
7. For all s  t, the difference in idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated, so that: 
Cov(vit, vis xitj) 
8. Conditional on xitj, the vit is independent and identically distributed normal 
random variables. However this is not a necessary assumption, only a 
preferable one.  
D.3 RE Assumptions 
1. The model should be linear in parameters and can be written as:  
Yit = 0 + Xit + (ui + vit)  
2. There should be a random sample in the cross section 
3. There should not be a perfect linear relationship between the explanatory 
variables. 
4. The independent variables must be exogenous on the unobserved effect: 
E(vit ui, xitj) = 0, and the expected value for all ui given all explanatory varibles 
is constant. This means that E(uit, xitj,) = 0 
5. The variance of the residuals on all explanatory variables should be constant: 
VAR(vit ui xitj) = 2, and the variance of ui given all explanatory variables is 
constant: VAR(uixitj) = 2. 
6. For all s  t, the difference in idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated, so that: 
Corr( vit, vis ui, xitj) 
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D.4 Fixed vs. Random Effects Model 
The table below shows the main difference between the fixed and the random effect 
model (Park, 2011) 
 
Table 20: Fixed vs. Random Effects Model 
 Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Functional 
form 
Yit = (0 + ui) + Xit + vit Yit = 0 + Xit + (ui + vit) 
Intercepts Varying across groups and/ or time Constant 
Error variances Constant Randomly distributed across 
groups and/or time 
Slopes Constant Constant 
Estimation LSDV, within effects estimation GLS, FGLS 
Source: Park (2011) 
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Appendix E: Evaluation of Assumptions 
 
E.1: Test for Linearity 
The most frequently used method to test the assumption of linearity is to create a plot 
showing residuals versus fitted values. If the residuals are plotted randomly around a 
horizontal line from 0 on the y-axis, the assumption that the relationship is linear is 
reasonable. There are some indications of non-linearity. However, as a whole the 
degree of linearity is considered reasonable. 
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E.2: Test for Normality 
 
A kernel density estimate is used to test the assumption of normality in the 
models. This tests the error term in the regression models. Figure 11 shows the 
kernel density estimate (the residuals) with the blue line and the normal 
distribution with the red line.
 
Figure 11: Kernel density estimate for normality 
 
 
The above figure illustrates that the residuals are close to normally distributed. 
Hence the assumption of normality holds. 
In addition to the kernel density estimate, a standardised normal probability plot 
(pnorm) and a plot showing the quantiles of a variable against the quantiles of 
normal distribution (qnorm) is created to further examine the normality 
assumption. 
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For pnorm, the data is plotted against a straight line normal distribution. The 
data points are then plotted around this line. If the data deviates from the 
straight line, this indicates a violation of the normality assumption. 
Figure 12: Standardised normal probability plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a slight deviation from the normality line in the figure. However, pnorm 
is very sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of the data. Overall it s 
concluded that the observations satisfy the assumption of normality.  
 
Figure 13: Quantiles of variable against quantiles of normal distribution plot 
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Qnorm is sensitive to non-normality near the tails. The above figure shows that 
there are some small deviations from normality in the upper tail, but this is 
considered a small discrepancy. It is therefore decided that the residuals are 
close to a normal distribution. 
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1. Descriptive Analysis 
1.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
describe id Year blev mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
              storage  display     value 
variable name   type   format      label      variable label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------- 
id              byte   %9.0g                   
Year            int    %8.0g                   
blev            float  %8.0g                   
mlev            float  %8.0g                   
prof            float  %8.0g                   
size            float  %8.0g                   
tang            float  %8.0g                   
grow            float  %8.0g                   
liq             float  %8.0g                   
ndts            float  %8.0g                   
 
 
 
summarize blev mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        blev |       630      .35706    .2219021          0      1.692 
        mlev |       630    .3384241    .2328915          0   1.344664 
        prof |       630    .0568626    .2298811   -2.34577   .7772421 
        size |       630    14.22577    2.382636          0    20.3747 
        tang |       630    .3883797    .3033154          0   1.544874 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        grow |       630    1.847847     6.11922  -13.54092    142.639 
         liq |       630    1.967522    3.272405   .0225177   65.38978 
        ndts |       630    .0548151    .0528267          0   .6750109 
1.2 Removing Extreme Outliers 
 
. graph box blev 
. drop if blev >1 
(5 observations deleted) 
. graph box mlev 
. drop if mlev >1 
(1 observation deleted) 
. graph box prof 
. drop if prof <-1 
(4 observations deleted) 
. graph box size 
. drop if size <5 
(6 observations deleted) 
. drop if size >20 
(6 observations deleted) 
 
. graph box tang 
. graph box grow 
. drop if grow >20 
(3 observations deleted) 
. drop if grow <-2 
(5 observations deleted) 
. graph box liq 
. drop if liq >10 
(7 observations deleted) 
. graph box ndts 
. drop if ndts >0.2 
(7 observations deleted) 
 
. summarize blev mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts Year id 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
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        blev |       586    .3552613    .2018068          0   .9719132 
        mlev |       586    .3444474    .2260944          0   .9403544 
        prof |       586    .0654489     .165628  -.9023686   .4910574 
        size |       586    14.31304    2.004264   6.131227   19.95171 
        tang |       586    .3936484    .3002437          0   1.544874 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        grow |       586    1.595904    1.658692  -.6249995   15.54134 
         liq |       586    1.710944    1.275764   .0605558   8.868263 
        ndts |       586     .049194    .0360434          0   .1967844 
        Year |       586    2009.971    1.998507       2007       2013 
          id |       586    45.37884    25.93957          1         90 
 
1.3 Correlation Matrix 
 
. corr blev mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
(obs=586) 
 
             |     blev     mlev     prof     size     tang     grow      liq     ndts 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        blev |   1.0000 
        mlev |   0.9029   1.0000 
        prof |  -0.0001  -0.0433   1.0000 
        size |  -0.0387  -0.0133   0.2125   1.0000 
        tang |   0.6666   0.6658   0.1409   0.0232   1.0000 
        grow |  -0.1573  -0.4283  -0.0167  -0.0616  -0.1915   1.0000 
         liq |  -0.3003  -0.3220  -0.1652  -0.2382  -0.3133   0.1250   1.0000 
        ndts |   0.0043  -0.0116   0.0399   0.0154   0.1279   0.0806  -0.1256   1.0000 
1. Pooled OLS Regression 
2.1 Model 1 – Book Value of Leverage 
 
. reg blev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     586 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   579) =   88.17 
       Model |  11.3752586     6  1.89587644           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  12.4494473   579  .021501636           R-squared     =  0.4775 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4720 
       Total |  23.8247059   585  .040725993           Root MSE      =  .14663 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        blev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |  -.1180871   .0379707    -3.11   0.002    -.1926641   -.0435101 
        size |  -.0066148   .0031791    -2.08   0.038    -.0128588   -.0003708 
        tang |   .4349388   .0218522    19.90   0.000     .3920196    .4778581 
        grow |  -.0017614   .0037627    -0.47   0.640    -.0091515    .0056288 
         liq |   -.021932   .0052098    -4.21   0.000    -.0321644   -.0116997 
        ndts |  -.5027592   .1714481    -2.93   0.003    -.8394951   -.1660232 
       _cons |   .3515232   .0513821     6.84   0.000     .2506053    .4524412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimate store olsblev 
 
 
2.2 Testing OLS Assumptions  
 
2.2.1 Linearity 
. rvpplot prof 
. rvpplot size 
. rvpplot tang 
. rvpplot grow 
. rvpplot liq  
. rvpplot ndts 
 
2.2.2 Normality 
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. sktest r 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint -----
- 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    
Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
- 
           r |    586      0.8957         0.1655         1.94         0.3783 
 
. kdensity r, normal 
 
. pnorm r 
 
. qnorm r 
 
2.2.3 Multicollinearity  
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         liq |      1.20    0.832029 
        tang |      1.17    0.853842 
        size |      1.10    0.905295 
        prof |      1.08    0.929292 
        grow |      1.06    0.943599 
        ndts |      1.04    0.962498 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.11 
 
2.2.4 Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
 
. rvfplot, yline (0) 
 
. **// White test \\** 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      58.38     27    0.0004 
            Skewness |      24.80      6    0.0004 
            Kurtosis |       1.02      1    0.3118 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      84.20     34    0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
  
. **// Breusch-Pagan test \\** 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of blev 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.25 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2634 
 
2.2.5 Testing for Autocorrelation  
 
. xtserial blev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      85) =     29.865 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
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2.3 Model 2 – Market Value of Leverage 
 
. reg mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     586 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   579) =  131.49 
       Model |  17.2470562     6  2.87450937           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  12.6573788   579  .021860758           R-squared     =  0.5767 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5724 
       Total |   29.904435   585  .051118692           Root MSE      =  .14785 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        mlev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |  -.1945976   .0382864    -5.08   0.000    -.2697949   -.1194004 
        size |  -.0054111   .0032056    -1.69   0.092    -.0117071    .0008848 
        tang |   .4482379   .0220339    20.34   0.000     .4049617     .491514 
        grow |  -.0403105    .003794   -10.62   0.000    -.0477621   -.0328588 
         liq |  -.0253397   .0052531    -4.82   0.000    -.0356571   -.0150222 
        ndts |  -.4728972   .1728739    -2.74   0.006    -.8124337   -.1333608 
       _cons |   .3891353   .0518094     7.51   0.000      .287378    .4908925 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimate store olsmlev 
 
2.4 Testing OLS Assumptions 
2.4.1 Heteroscedasticity  
 
. **// White test \\** 
. stat imtest 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     142.51     27    0.0000 
            Skewness |     116.55      6    0.0000 
            Kurtosis |       0.44      1    0.5048 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     259.50     34    0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. **// Breusch-Pagan test \\** 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of mlev 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.49 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4844 
 
2.4.2 Autocorrelation 
 
. xtserial mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      85) =     18.282 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
2.5 Comparing Pooled OLS for the two models 
 
. estimates table olsblev olsmlev 
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---------------------------------------- 
    Variable |  olsblev      olsmlev     
-------------+-------------------------- 
        prof | -.11808707   -.19459765   
        size | -.00661481   -.00541113   
        tang |  .43493884    .44823785   
        grow | -.00176136   -.04031047   
         liq | -.02193204   -.02533965   
        ndts | -.50275915   -.47289724   
       _cons |  .35152322    .38913527   
 
 94 
3. Evaluating Panel Data Estimation Methods 
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Panel Data 
 
. sort id Year 
. tsset id Year 
       panel variable:  id (unbalanced) 
        time variable:  Year, 2007 to 2013, but with gaps 
                delta:  1 unit 
 
.  
. xtsum blev mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
blev     overall |  .3552613   .2018068          0   .9719132 |     N =     586 
         between |             .1813131   .0271872   .8005603 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .0961268  -.1227003   .8041916 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
mlev     overall |  .3444474   .2260944          0   .9403544 |     N =     586 
         between |             .2040186   .0135325   .7836719 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .1060605  -.1805433   .7554036 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
prof     overall |  .0654489    .165628  -.9023686   .4910574 |     N =     586 
         between |             .1441238  -.6886512   .3782189 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .1051651  -.6321375   .4951032 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
size     overall |  14.31304   2.004264   6.131227   19.95171 |     N =     586 
         between |             1.918281   8.344688   19.20593 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .8948678   6.460872   19.23701 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
tang     overall |  .3936484   .3002437          0   1.544874 |     N =     586 
         between |             .2872676    .003679   .9076724 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .0979028  -.2531918   1.036285 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
grow     overall |  1.595904   1.658692  -.6249995   15.54134 |     N =     586 
         between |             1.225009   .2475393   6.578539 |     n =      90 
         within  |             1.221715  -4.258824   10.67818 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
liq      overall |  1.710944   1.275764   .0605558   8.868263 |     N =     586 
         between |             1.101435    .318166   7.677907 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .8036921  -.7862038   6.353968 | T-bar = 6.51111 
                 |                                            | 
ndts     overall |   .049194   .0360434          0   .1967844 |     N =     586 
         between |             .0341203   .0010025   .1753201 |     n =      90 
         within  |             .0179038  -.0308673   .1435742 | T-bar = 6.51111 
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3.2 Model 1: Book value of Leverage 
 
3.2.1 Fixed Effect estimation 
 
. xtreg blev prof size tang grow liq ndts, fe i(id) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       586 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        90 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2951                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.5357                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.4635                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(6,490)           =     34.18 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0265                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        blev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |  -.1499056   .0358561    -4.18   0.000    -.2203562    -.079455 
        size |  -.0041351   .0041152    -1.00   0.315    -.0122207    .0039506 
        tang |   .4648519   .0406494    11.44   0.000     .3849834    .5447205 
        grow |   .0109849   .0030554     3.60   0.000     .0049816    .0169883 
         liq |  -.0139587   .0050339    -2.77   0.006    -.0238495    -.004068 
        ndts |  -.4497298   .2126567    -2.11   0.035    -.8675613   -.0318983 
       _cons |   .2697453   .0616452     4.38   0.000     .1486239    .3908668 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .12355539 
     sigma_e |  .08818594 
         rho |  .66250649   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(89, 490) =    12.48             Prob > F = 0.0000 
estimate store fixedblev 
 
3.2.2 Random Effect Estimation 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       
586 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        90 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2942                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.5428                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.4681                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =    308.32 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        blev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |  -.1390454   .0332319    -4.18   0.000    -.2041786   -.0739121 
        size |  -.0038564   .0035378    -1.09   0.276    -.0107904    .0030776 
        tang |   .4587378   .0311623    14.72   0.000     .3976608    .5198149 
        grow |   .0090431   .0029161     3.10   0.002     .0033276    .0147586 
         liq |  -.0163805   .0046029    -3.56   0.000     -.025402    -.007359 
        ndts |  -.4880205   .1850666    -2.64   0.008    -.8507444   -.1252966 
       _cons |   .2755688   .0555092     4.96   0.000     .1667727    .3843649 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .11776774 
     sigma_e |  .08818594 
         rho |  .64072996   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 . estimate store randomblev 
3.2.3 RE vs. FE 
 
. estimates table fixedblev randomblev 
 
---------------------------------------- 
    Variable | fixedblev    randomblev   
-------------+-------------------------- 
        prof | -.14990557   -.13904538   
        size | -.00413507   -.00385638   
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        tang |  .46485193    .45873781   
        grow |  .01098495    .00904309   
         liq | -.01395872   -.01638051   
        ndts | -.44972981   -.48802048   
       _cons |  .26974532    .27556878   
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.2.4 Breusch Pagan LM – Test  
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        blev[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                    blev |    .040726       .2018068 
                       e |   .0077768       .0881859 
                       u |   .0138692       .1177677 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   663.43 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
 
3.2.5 Hausman Test 
 
. hausman fixedblev randomblev 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
             |   fixedblev    randomblev     Difference          S.E. 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
        prof |   -.1499056    -.1390454       -.0108602        .0134648 
        size |   -.0041351    -.0038564       -.0002787        .0021021 
        tang |    .4648519     .4587378        .0061141        .0261013 
        grow |    .0109849     .0090431        .0019419         .000912 
         liq |   -.0139587    -.0163805        .0024218        .0020381 
        ndts |   -.4497298    -.4880205        .0382907        .1047531 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from 
xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from 
xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        6.18 
      Prob>chi2 =      0.4038 
 97 
3.3 Model 2: Market Value of Leverage 
 
3.3.1 Fixed Effects Estimation 
. xtreg mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts, fe i(id) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       586 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        90 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3680                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.6352                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.5610                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(6,490)           =     47.56 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1268                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        mlev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |  -.1632551   .0374583    -4.36   0.000    -.2368539   -.0896564 
        size |   -.000119   .0042991    -0.03   0.978    -.0085659     .008328 
        tang |   .4340189   .0424658    10.22   0.000     .3505813    .5174564 
        grow |  -.0236681    .003192    -7.41   0.000    -.0299397   -.0173965 
         liq |  -.0246893   .0052589    -4.69   0.000    -.0350221   -.0143566 
        ndts |  -.2298814   .2221595    -1.03   0.301    -.6663842    .2066214 
       _cons |    .277307   .0643998     4.31   0.000     .1507731    .4038409 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .12481067 
     sigma_e |  .09212662 
         rho |  .64731735   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(89, 490) =    11.25             Prob > F = 0.0000 
. estimate store fixedmlev 
 
3.3.2 Random Effects Estimation 
. xtreg mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts, re i(id) 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       586 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        90 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3672                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.6418                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.5659                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =    440.90 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        mlev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |   -.169078   .0345463    -4.89   0.000    -.2367875   -.1013684 
        size |  -.0013304   .0036519    -0.36   0.716    -.0084881    .0058272 
        tang |   .4501003   .0318536    14.13   0.000     .3876683    .5125323 
        grow |  -.0261529   .0030414    -8.60   0.000    -.0321139   -.0201919 
         liq |  -.0247853   .0047811    -5.18   0.000    -.0341561   -.0154144 
        ndts |  -.3496479   .1911873    -1.83   0.067    -.7243682    .0250724 
       _cons |     .29749   .0572763     5.19   0.000     .1852305    .4097496 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .11531709 
     sigma_e |  .09212662 
         rho |  .61041179   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. estimate store randommlev 
 
3.3.3 RE vs. FE 
. estimates table fixedmlev randommlev 
 
---------------------------------------- 
    Variable | fixedmlev    randommlev   
-------------+-------------------------- 
        prof | -.16325515   -.16907796   
        size | -.00011896   -.00133041   
        tang |  .43401887    .45010032   
        grow | -.02366806   -.02615288   
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         liq | -.02468934   -.02478526   
        ndts | -.22988138   -.34964788   
       _cons |  .27730698    .29749003   
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.3.4 Breusch Pagan LM – Test  
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        mlev[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                    mlev |   .0511187       .2260944 
                       e |   .0084873       .0921266 
                       u |    .013298       .1153171 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   579.80 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
 
3.3.5 Hausman Test 
 
. hausman fixedmlev randommlev 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
             |   fixedmlev    randommlev     Difference          S.E. 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
        prof |   -.1632551     -.169078        .0058228        .0144802 
        size |    -.000119    -.0013304        .0012114        .0022684 
        tang |    .4340189     .4501003       -.0160814        .0280837 
        grow |   -.0236681    -.0261529        .0024848        .0009688 
         liq |   -.0246893    -.0247853        .0000959        .0021901 
        ndts |   -.2298814    -.3496479        .1197665         .113147 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from 
xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from 
xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       11.25 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0810 
 
 
3.4 OLS vs RE vs FE 
 
. estimate table olsblev olsmlev fixedblev fixedmlev randomblev randommlev 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |  olsblev      olsmlev     fixedblev    fixedmlev    randomblev   randommlev   
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        prof | -.11808707   -.19459765   -.14990557   -.16325515   -.13904538   -.16907796   
        size | -.00661481   -.00541113   -.00413507   -.00011896   -.00385638   -.00133041   
        tang |  .43493884    .44823785    .46485193    .43401887    .45873781    .45010032   
        grow | -.00176136   -.04031047    .01098495   -.02366806    .00904309   -.02615288   
         liq | -.02193204   -.02533965   -.01395872   -.02468934   -.01638051   -.02478526   
        ndts | -.50275915   -.47289724   -.44972981   -.22988138   -.48802048   -.34964788   
       _cons |  .35152322    .38913527    .26974532    .27730698    .27556878    .29749003   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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3.5 Random Effects Cluster Robust Regression 
3.5.1 Book Value of Leverage 
 
. xtreg blev prof size tang grow liq ndts, re cluster(id) 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       586 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        90 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2942                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.5428                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.4681                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =    144.58 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 90 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        blev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |  -.1390454   .0568761    -2.44   0.014    -.2505205   -.0275702 
        size |  -.0038564   .0038552    -1.00   0.317    -.0114124    .0036996 
        tang |   .4587378   .0502777     9.12   0.000     .3601954    .5572802 
        grow |   .0090431   .0069247     1.31   0.192     -.004529    .0226152 
         liq |  -.0163805   .0061101    -2.68   0.007    -.0283562   -.0044048 
        ndts |  -.4880205   .3075745    -1.59   0.113    -1.090855    .1148144 
       _cons |   .2755688   .0668995     4.12   0.000     .1444481    .4066895 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .11776774 
     sigma_e |  .08818594 
         rho |  .64072996   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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3.5.2 Market Value of Leverage 
 
. xtreg mlev prof size tang grow liq ndts, re cluster(id) 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       586 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        90 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3672                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.6418                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.5659                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(6)       =    241.45 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 90 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        mlev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        prof |   -.169078   .0482686    -3.50   0.000    -.2636827   -.0744733 
        size |  -.0013304   .0039313    -0.34   0.735    -.0090357    .0063749 
        tang |   .4501003   .0419777    10.72   0.000     .3678256     .532375 
        grow |  -.0261529   .0076855    -3.40   0.001    -.0412161   -.0110896 
         liq |  -.0247853   .0070538    -3.51   0.000    -.0386105   -.0109601 
        ndts |  -.3496479   .3048941    -1.15   0.251    -.9472294    .2479337 
       _cons |     .29749   .0700742     4.25   0.000     .1601471    .4348329 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .11531709 
     sigma_e |  .09212662 
         rho |  .61041179   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
3.5.3 Comparing the Models 
 
. . estimate table robustblev robustmlev 
 
---------------------------------------- 
    Variable | robustblev   robustmlev   
-------------+-------------------------- 
        prof | -.13904538   -.16907796   
        size | -.00385638   -.00133041   
        tang |  .45873781    .45010032   
        grow |  .00904309   -.02615288   
         liq | -.01638051   -.02478526   
        ndts | -.48802048   -.34964788   
       _cons |  .27556878    .29749003   
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
